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  This Article proposes a textualist approach to regulatory 
interpretation. Regulatory textualism, however, should be distinct 
from statutory textualism. Judges should interpret regulations armed 
not with dictionaries or other general linguistic aids, but rather with a 
hierarchy of sources that sheds light on the text’s public meaning. 
Methodologically, this approach tailors positive political theory 
insights to the rulemaking process. That process features a number of 
pivotal actors, or veto-gates, who must sign off on a regulation before 
it can proceed. The court’s interpretive task is to privilege those 
statements that are more likely to be credible—sincere, not strategic—
reflections of the text’s public meaning. 
  Specifically, the judge should first consider the preamble’s 
provision-by-provision explanations, which frequently respond to 
public comments raising potential ambiguities. If ambiguity persists, 
the judge should then consult the regulatory analyses, which predict 
the rule’s consequences under specific factual scenarios. Both 
congressional and presidential veto-gates, as well as the public more 
generally, rely on these analyses when engaging with the regulatory 
process. Finally, if these materials conflict, the court should then defer 
to the agency’s interpretation—provided that the agency provides a 
reasoned explanation. In this manner, regulatory textualism asks how 
the reasonable reader of a rule would have understood its meaning as 
negotiated by the President, Congress, and other politically legitimate 
actors. 
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INTRODUCTION 
Regulatory texts often result from fierce negotiations during the 
rulemaking process. These fights can be just as heated as those that 
occur over statutes. Indeed, when Congress delegates rulemaking 
authority to an agency, it empowers administrators to engage in 
binding lawmaking.1 Consider, for example, recent battles over 
whether the Federal Communications Commission (FCC) should 
regulate Internet providers as a public utility2 or whether the 
Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) should curb carbon 
emissions from existing power plants.3 Each of these debates featured 
 
 1. See, e.g., Ariz. Grocery Co. v. Atchison, Topeka & Santa Fe Ry. Co., 284 U.S. 370, 386 
(1932) (characterizing a rulemaking agency as a body that “speaks as the legislature” with 
“pronouncement[s that have] the force of a statute”); Randy J. Kozel & Jeffrey A. Pojanowski, 
Administrative Change, 59 UCLA L. REV. 112, 116 (2011) (“An agency with authority to issue 
these regulations acts as a delegate of Congress, and a lawfully enacted legislative rule binds the 
public, the courts, and the agency itself with the force of a statute.”).  
 2. See Jonathan Weisman, F.C.C. Net Neutrality Rules Clear Hurdle as Republicans 
Concede to Obama, N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 24, 2015, at A1. 
 3. See Suzanne Goldenberg, Obama Defends New Carbon Emission Rules in Face of 
Mounting Backlash, THE GUARDIAN (June 2, 2014, 6:43 PM), http://www.theguardian.com/
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presidential pronouncements4 and legislative threats,5 alongside 
heated discussions within and with agencies—involving the President, 
Congress, interest groups, and the courts. Lower-profile legislative 
rules garner less attention, to be sure, but emerge in the shadow of 
these political debates. 
Contrary to the conventional view of rulemaking as a coherent 
and rationalized process of reason-giving, regulatory drafting is often 
an exercise in political compromise. Given the stakes involved, 
interested parties have thus become increasingly savvy about the 
many levers available to influence the process.6 These avenues could 
include informal meetings with agency staff, phone calls with White 
House officials, participation in congressional oversight hearings, and 
aggressive litigation threats.7 Each of these junctures presents 
renewed opportunities to lobby drafters for changes to the final 
regulatory text and accompanying materials. Indeed, the modern 
rulemaking process departs in many ways from the idealized version 
often presented in administrative-law casebooks and centered on the 




 4. See, e.g., Ezra Mechaber, President Obama Urges FCC to Implement Stronger Net 
Neutrality Rules, THE WHITE HOUSE BLOG (Nov. 10, 2014, 9:15 AM), https://www.whitehouse.
gov/blog/2014/11/10/president-obama-urges-fcc-implement-stronger-net-neutrality-rules [http://
perma.cc/5HTY-TXLE]; Press Release, The White House, Statement by the President on the 
Ozone National Ambient Air Quality Standards (Sept. 2, 2011), https://www.whitehouse.gov/
the-press-office/2011/09/02/statement-president-ozone-national-ambient-air-quality-standards 
[http://perma.cc/CKQ2-VNFR]. 
 5. See, e.g., Tom Risen, Lawmakers Grill FCC Chair on Internet Regulation, U.S. NEWS 
(Sept. 17, 2014, 6:18 PM), http://www.usnews.com/news/articles/2014/09/17/congress-challenges-
fcc-chairman-on-net-neutrality [http://perma.cc/2LLG-RVHE]; Cat Zakrzewski, Republicans 
Continue Fight Against Net Neutrality with Three New Proposals, TECHCRUNCH (Apr. 22, 
2015), http://techcrunch.com/2015/04/21/republicans-continue-fight-against-net-neutrality-with-
three-new-proposals/#.zyuvhz:k8dV [http://perma.cc/LF25-FGCJ]. 
 6. See Thomas O. McGarity, Administrative Law as Blood Sport: Policy Erosion in a 
Highly Partisan Age, 61 DUKE L.J. 1671, 1679 (2011) (“The roster of [regulatory] players has 
expanded beyond agency and OIRA staffs, advocates for the regulated industry and beneficiary 
groups, and congressional aides to include individuals and organizations with broad policy 
agendas, such as the U.S. Chamber of Commerce, think tanks, grassroots organizations, media 
pundits, and Internet bloggers.”). 
 7. See id. at 1703–19 (surveying various tactics of “blood sport” regulatory policy making).  
 8. See Daniel A. Farber & Anne Joseph O’Connell, The Lost World of Administrative 
Law, 92 TEX. L. REV. 1137, 1140 (2014) (“[T]he actual workings of the administrative state have 
increasingly diverged from the assumptions animating the APA and classic judicial decisions 
that followed.”). 
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The interpretation of regulations, in turn, requires attention to 
these rulemaking realities.9 Regulations are bargains struck at pivotal 
points in the rule-drafting process. These negotiations occur between 
interested parties and politically accountable actors such as the 
agency head, the President, and Congress.10 What legitimates this 
dynamic is not the ensuing private agreements, but rather the 
collective rationales that accompany the resulting texts. Since these 
rationales inform how the public understands the final regulation, 
judges should look to these materials as valid sources of 
interpretation. 
Accordingly, this Article develops an approach—what it calls 
regulatory textualism—that focuses on the public meaning of the 
rule’s legally binding text. In doing so, it offers a distinctly textualist 
approach for the still-nascent literature on regulatory interpretation, 
which has been recently reinvigorated by Professor Kevin Stack.11 
Regulatory textualism, however, is distinct from statutory textualism: 
the judge should interpret the codified text armed not with 
dictionaries or other general linguistic aids, but rather by structured 
reference to select materials generated by the regulatory drafting 
process. This approach views rulemaking as the product of 
procedures imposed by the President, Congress, and the courts to 
imbue the rulemaking with legitimacy. The method thus draws upon 
these review processes to generate a hierarchy of sources based on 
their public accessibility, reliability, and relevance to the interpretive 
question. Different forms of regulatory history can be ranked 
 
 9. See Lars Noah, Divining Regulatory Intent: The Place for a “Legislative History” of 
Agency Rules, 51 HASTINGS L.J. 255, 281 (2000) (observing that “it is far easier to ascribe an 
intent to an agency when it issues a rule than to a legislature when it enacts a statute, both 
because of differences in their decisionmaking routines and because of the greater reliability of 
the materials that document the bases for their decisions”); Kevin M. Stack, Interpreting 
Regulations, 111 MICH. L. REV. 355, 380 (2012) (noting that distinctive features of the regulatory 
process such as “the APA’s procedural requirement that the agency issue a statement of basis 
and purpose, the arbitrary and capricious review’s standard of rationality, and Chenery’s timing 
rule” justify regulatory purposivism); id. at 392–94 (noting that “the critical difference between 
regulations and statutes is how the court discerns purposes”); Russell L. Weaver, Judicial 
Interpretation of Administrative Regulations: An Overview, 53 U. CINN. L. REV. 681, 711 (1984) 
(“Courts must treat regulations differently than statutes because agencies generate different 
types of interpretive materials than do legislatures. Instead of committee reports, explanations 
of committee chairmen, records of debate and the other materials that legislatures typically 
create, agencies prepare notices of proposed rulemakings, draft rules, regulatory analyses and 
other documents.”). 
 10. Such bargains, of course, are not to be confused with the wholly distinct procedure of 
negotiated rulemaking, which raises a different set of issues not addressed here.  
 11. See generally Stack, supra note 9. 
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according to the source’s likelihood to shed credible light on the 
public meaning of a text with the appropriate level of generality. 
Specifically, judges should first consider the preamble’s detailed 
provision-by-provision analysis of the regulation, which frequently 
responds to public comments raising potential ambiguities in the 
proposed regulation.12 This source is the best evidence of the 
regulatory text’s public meaning because it results from the agency’s 
back-and-forth with external commenters and political monitors. If 
ambiguity persists, the judge should then consult the regulatory 
analyses, which apply the regulation to specific factual scenarios to 
predict the rule’s consequences. Congressional and presidential 
reviewers, as well as the public more generally, rely on these analyses 
when engaging in the regulatory process. This hierarchy of 
interpretive sources tracks the most reliable and accessible materials 
likely to reflect, in varying degrees, how a reasonable reader of the 
regulation would have understood the meaning of the regulation as 
negotiated by the President, Congress, and other authoritative 
regulatory actors.13 If these materials conflict with each other or 
 
 12. To maintain consistency with other scholars’ terminology, this Article will also define 
“preamble” as the agency’s statement of basis and purpose. See, e.g., Stack, supra note 9, at 360–
61 & n.22 (equating “preamble” with the “statement[s] of basis and purpose” required by the 
APA) (alteration in original). Note, however, that the term is sometimes used differently by 
other scholars to include other materials that agencies publish in the Federal Register alongside 
the text and statement of basis and purpose, such as the regulatory analyses required by various 
executive orders and statutes. See, e.g., CORNELIUS M. KERWIN & SCOTT R. FURLONG, 
RULEMAKING: HOW GOVERNMENT AGENCIES WRITE LAW AND MAKE POLICY 75–86 (4th ed. 
2011) (observing that agencies “report in preambles the results of the reviews they are required 
to conduct under a variety of statutes and executive orders”); id. at 63 (“[A]gencies report in 
preambles the results of the reviews they are required to conduct under the Paperwork 
Reduction Act, the Regulatory Flexibility Act, and Executive Order 12,866.”); see also KEVIN 
M. STACK, GUIDANCE IN THE RULEMAKING PROCESS: EVALUATING PREAMBLES, 
REGULATORY TEXT, AND FREESTANDING DOCUMENTS AS VEHICLES FOR REGULATORY 
GUIDANCE 11, http://www.acus.gov/sites/default/files/documents/Guidance%20in%20the%20
Rulemaking%20Process%20Revised%20Draft%20Report%205_16_14%20ks%20final.pdf 
[http://perma.cc/7L57-WGBQ] (noting that preambles include “engagement with 
commentators”); Noah, supra note 9, at 311 (observing that “a preamble may have included 
reassurances in response to comments that expressed concerns about particular applications of a 
proposed rule”). 
 13. For a sample of the statutory-interpretation literature drawing on positive political 
theory, see, for example, Cheryl Boudreau, Arthur Lupia, Mathew D. McCubbins & Daniel B. 
Rodriguez, What Statutes Mean: Interpretive Lessons from Positive Theories of Communication 
and Legislation, 44 SAN DIEGO L. REV. 957, 958 (2007); William N. Eskridge, Jr. & John 
Ferejohn, The Article I, Section 7 Game, 80 GEO. L.J. 523, 523–24 (1992); McNollgast, 
Legislative Intent: The Use of Positive Political Theory in Statutory Interpretation, 57 L. & 
CONTEMP. PROBS. 3, 5–6 (1994) [hereinafter McNollgast, Legislative Intent] (describing how 
positive political theory approaches “overlap[] the legal scholarship that instructs the court to 
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otherwise cannot resolve the ambiguity, however, the court should 
then defer to the agency’s interpretation—provided that the agency 
offers a reasoned explanation.  
Methodologically, this approach attempts to tailor positive 
political theory insights to help identify the regulatory text’s public 
meaning. Indeed, the rulemaking process features a number of 
pivotal actors, or veto-gates, who must sign off on a regulation before 
it can proceed further.14 Once these pivotal actors have been 
identified, the court’s task is to privilege those statements in the 
rulemaking record that are most likely to be credible reflections of 
the public meaning to which regulatory actors agreed.15 Put 
differently, judges should rely on materials that are likely to be 
sincere, as opposed to strategic attempts to misstate the terms of the 
agreement.16 Statements are sincere when they would incur some cost 
if the speaker misrepresented the bargain.17 
This approach balances a number of institutional considerations 
for selecting among alternative interpretive methods.18 By restricting 
the degrees of freedom to choose sources, it attempts to reduce 
judicial decision costs. In contrast to an approach that would consult 
only linguistic aids, however, regulatory textualism also seeks to 
minimize judicial discretion by identifying narrow contexts in which 
 
ascertain as accurately as possible the ‘original intent’ of legislation”); McNollgast, Positive 
Canons: The Role of Legislative Bargains in Statutory Interpretation, 80 GEO. L.J. 705, 707 n.5 
(1992) [hereinafter McNollgast, Positive Canons]; Daniel B. Rodriguez & Barry R. Weingast, 
The Positive Political Theory of Legislative History: New Perspectives on the 1964 Civil Rights 
Act and Its Interpretation, 151 U. PA. L. REV. 1417, 1418–21 (2003). 
 14. The term “veto-gate” seems to have first appeared in the legal literature in McNollgast, 
Positive Canons, supra note 13, at 707 & n.5. Variations of the core idea are also sometimes 
referred to as “pivot points,” “veto players,” or the politics of “negative power”—terms which 
this Article will use interchangeably. See, e.g., CHARLES CAMERON, VETO BARGAINING 3 
(2000) (defining the politics of “negative power” as the “consequences of an institutionalized 
ability to say no”); KEITH KREHBIEL, PIVOTAL POLITICS 23–24 (1998) (drawing on dictionary 
definition to specify a “pivot” as “a person or thing on or around which something turns or 
depends”). 
 15. See KREHBIEL, supra note 14, at 23–24 (defining actors that serve as “pivot[s]”). 
 16. See McNollgast, Positive Canons, supra note 13, at 707 (“A positive political theory 
approach also offers guidance in sorting out meaningful or sincere evaluations of legislative 
language from strategic or opportunistic posturing by legislators or the President.”). 
 17. McNollgast, Legislative Intent, supra note 13, at 26 (“Observing costly actions can help 
judges exclude some alternative interpretations.”). 
 18. See ADRIAN VERMEULE, JUDGING UNDER UNCERTAINTY 111 (2006); Cass R. 
Sunstein & Adrian Vermeule, Interpretations and Institutions, 101 MICH. L. REV. 885, 886 (2003) 
(arguing that “debates over legal interpretation cannot be sensibly resolved without attention to 
[institutional] capacities”).  
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potentially specialized terms should be understood. Moreover, unlike 
intentionalist and purposivist approaches that encourage judges to 
further what they perceive to be the relevant policy goals, regulatory 
textualism instead calls for judges to defer to agencies that are better 
suited to the task. In doing so, it allows flexibility for the current 
agency’s well-reasoned interpretation when the regulatory text is 
otherwise ambiguous. 
Part I discusses how various scholars thus far have proposed 
interpreting regulations by reference to the agency’s intent or 
purpose. It then evaluates intentionalist and purposivist approaches 
against various criteria: the need to constrain judicial discretion, 
comparative institutional competencies between agencies and courts, 
and the minimization of strategic agency incentives to subvert 
rulemaking procedures. Part II then explores the rationales for a 
textualist theory, but rejects a plain-meaning approach based solely 
on the regulatory text and linguistic sources. Instead, it proposes a 
method based on sources most likely to shed light on the rule’s public 
meaning as authorized by politically accountable actors. Finally, Part 
III asks how and when a court should defer to an agency’s 
construction of an ambiguous provision and concludes that deference 
is due when the agency provides a sufficiently reasoned explanation. 
I.  JUDICIAL REGULATORY INTERPRETATION 
Regulatory interpretation requires judges to choose among 
competing interpretive methods based on considerations unique to 
the rulemaking process.19 The most well-developed scholarly 
approaches currently advocate some version of intentionalism or 
purposivism. The resulting debate features nuanced disagreements 
about the appropriate goals and sources of regulatory interpretation.20 
 
 19. A judge could be a purposivist in statutory interpretation based on one set of reasons, 
for example, but a textualist in regulatory interpretation (or vice versa), due to a distinctive set 
of concerns. See John F. Manning, Constitutional Structure and Judicial Deference to Agency 
Interpretations of Agency Rules, 96 COLUM. L. REV. 612, 689 (1996) (“[I]mportant differences 
between the regulatory and legislative processes offer agencies the opportunity to produce 
explanatory materials that courts may consult in ascertaining regulatory meaning.”); Stack, 
supra note 9, at 361 (arguing that “a theory of regulatory interpretation must be grounded in the 
distinctive character of regulations and the institutions that issue them”). 
 20. See Stack, supra note 9, at 358 (“We lack a debate over, much less an account of, the 
basic elements of regulatory interpretation, including ‘the overall goal of interpretation,’ ‘the 
admissible sources the interpreter may consider in attempting to achieve that goal,’ and the 
relationships among those sources.”); id. at 377 (noting that “two key elements in a theory of 
legal interpretation” include “the privileged sources of interpretation” as well as the “goals” of 
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Though applying labels to these proposed methods can be hazardous 
given their overlapping premises,21 labels can nonetheless help to 
highlight the stakes involved.22 This Part critically examines this 
debate and concludes that both purposivism and intentionalism are 
ultimately ill-suited to judicial regulatory interpretation.23 
A. Competing Approaches 
Despite the fact that regulations overwhelm statutes in number 
and scope,24 neither judges nor scholars have confronted regulations 
 
interpretation); cf. WILLIAM N. ESKRIDGE, JR., PHILIP R. FRICKRY & ELIZABETH GARRETT, 
LEGISLATION AND STATUTORY INTERPRETATION 219 (2006) (distinguishing “between the 
overall goal of instated or implied, of the ends, aims, or goals of statutory interpretation” as well 
as “[w]hat sources are admissible” and whether “those sources [should] be arranged in some 
hierarchy and consulted sequentially”). 
 21. See, e.g., John F. Manning, What Divides Textualists from Purposivists?, 106 COLUM. L. 
REV. 70, 75 (2006) (acknowledging that “textualism and purposivism do in fact share more 
conceptual common ground than textualists . . . have sometimes emphasized”); Jonathan T. 
Molot, The Rise and Fall of Textualism, 106 COLUM. L. REV. 1, 3 (2006) (arguing that “when 
one considers how modern textualists go about identifying textual meaning and how 
purposivists go about identifying statutory purposes, the differences between textualism and 
purposivism begin to fade”); Caleb Nelson, What Is Textualism?, 91 VA. L. REV. 347, 349 (2005) 
(arguing that the differences between textualism and purposivism “are less categorical than 
either textualists or their critics generally acknowledge”); Jonathan R. Siegel, The Inexorable 
Radicalization of Textualism, 158 U. PA. L. REV. 117, 125 (2009) (referring to “the 
accommodationists” that have “focused on similarities among, rather than differences between, 
the rival methods” of textualism and intentionalism). 
 22. Cf. Abbe R. Gluck, The States as Laboratories of Statutory Interpretation: 
Methodological Consensus and the New Modified Textualism, 119 YALE L.J. 1750, 1832 (2010) 
(“Labels are unfortunately important in statutory interpretation.”). This insight is particularly 
true when specified with attention to an authors’ own self-characterizations. 
 23. Importantly, the focus here is on how judges—as opposed to agencies with different 
institutional competencies—should engage in regulatory interpretation. Cf. Jerry L. Mashaw, 
Agency-Centered or Court-Centered Administrative Law? A Dialogue with Richard Pierce on 
Agency Statutory Interpretation, 59 ADMIN L. REV. 889, 889–93 (2007); Jerry L. Mashaw, 
Between Facts and Norms: Agency Statutory Interpretation as an Autonomous Enterprise, 55 U. 
TORONTO L.J. 497, 497–501 (2005); Peter L. Strauss, When the Judge is Not the Primary Official 
with Responsibility to Read: Agency Interpretation and the Problem of Legislative History, 66 
CHI.-KENT L. REV. 321, 321–22 (1990). But see Richard J. Pierce, Jr., How Agencies Should 
Give Meaning to the Statutes They Administer: A Response to Mashaw and Strauss, 59 ADMIN. L. 
REV. 197, 197–205 (2007). Relatedly, some argue that administrative agencies are better situated 
(and more likely) to interpret statutes purposively, while courts are better suited to apply 
textualist premises. This Article argues that such arguments are even stronger when it comes to 
the agencies’ interpretation of their own regulations. See VERMEULE, supra note 18, at 111; 
Michael Herz, Purposivism and Institutional Competence in Statutory Interpretation, 2009 MICH. 
ST. L. REV. 89, 92; Sunstein & Vermeule, supra note 18, at 928. 
 24. See KERWIN & FURLONG, supra note 12, at 13–21 (documenting increase since the 
1970s in number of rules and pages in the Federal Register far exceeding that of statutory texts); 
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with the level of interpretive sophistication applied to constitutions, 
statutes, or contracts.25 Instead, most judicial approaches can best be 
described as erratic;26 worse, some judges blithely apply statutory-
interpretation methods to regulations without any reflection at all.27 
Previous precedents themselves provide inconsistent guidance. On 
the one hand, some call for courts to consult the “plain words” of the 
regulation’s text when interpreting it.28 Other courts have instead 
looked to the “Secretary’s intent at the time of the regulation’s 
promulgation” and have consulted an array of materials such as 
versions of the regulation over time, interpretations of other agencies 
with similar words in their regulations, and public comments.29 
 
Noah, supra note 9, at 259 (noting the “far greater prevalence of legislative rules issued by 
agencies than by Congress”).  
 25. See, e.g., Noah, supra note 9, at 258–59 (noting that “[a] few scholars have applied 
insights gleaned from the intense debate over methods of statutory interpretation to other texts 
having the same force and effect as legislation” but that “[t]he same interpretative issues 
involving legislative rules promulgated by administrative agencies have gone largely 
unnoticed”); Stack, supra note 9, at 357 (“While all agree that regulations are primary sources of 
law, strikingly little attention has been devoted to the method of their interpretation.”); Russell 
L. Weaver, Judicial Interpretation of Administrative Regulation: The Deference Rule, 45 U. PITT. 
L. REV. 587, 589 (1984) (“Although commentators have lavished attention on the subject of 
statutory construction, they have virtually ignored the problem of how to interpret 
regulations.”). 
 26. See Stack, supra note 9, at 359 (observing that “courts have not developed a consistent 
approach to regulatory interpretation”); id. at 376 (noting that decisions involving regulatory 
interpretation exhibit an “ad hoc quality”); Weaver, supra note 9, at 683 (“Courts have not . . . 
evolved a uniform interpretive theory to apply to regulations.”). 
 27. See Frank C. Newman, How Courts Interpret Regulations, 35 CALIF. L. REV. 509, 509–
10 (1947) (observing that “lawyers have often treated regulations as statutes, particularly when 
interpretive questions arise”); Stack, supra note 9, at 368–70 (noting that “courts rely on 
principles of statutory interpretation without pausing or commenting on the justification for 
applying those principles to regulations and without situating their approach in relation to other 
decisions in which courts have construed regulations”); Weaver, supra note 9, at 682 (“Most 
courts assume that regulations should be interpreted using principles of statutory 
construction.”); see also, e.g., Nat’l Ass’n of Home Builders v. Defs. of Wildlife, 551 U.S. 644, 
669 (2007) (applying statutory “canon against implied repeals” to regulation); Rucker v. 
Wabash R.R., 418 F.2d 146, 149 (7th Cir. 1969) (citing II SUTHERLAND, STATUTES AND 
STATUTORY CONSTRUCTION § 4007 (3d ed. 1943)) (“Administrative regulations, like statutes, 
must be construed by courts, and the same rules of interpretation are applicable in both cases.”). 
 28. Bowles v. Seminole Rock & Sand Co., 325 U.S. 410, 414 (1945); see also Chase Bank 
USA, N.A. v. McCoy, 562 U.S. 195, 203–08 (2011); Christensen v. Harris Cnty., 529 U.S. 576, 
586–88 (2000); Auer v. Robbins, 519 U.S. 452, 461 (1997); Thomas Jefferson Univ. v. Shalala, 
512 U.S. 504, 514 (1994); Sec’y of Labor v. W. Fuels-Utah, Inc., 900 F.2d 318, 321 (D.C. Cir. 
1990). 
 29. See, e.g., Gardebring v. Jenkins, 485 U.S. 415, 430 (1988); In re Transcon Lines, 89 F.3d 
559, 567 (9th Cir. 1996); SSM Rehab. Inst. v. Shalala, 68 F.3d 266, 269–71 (8th Cir. 1995); United 
States v. Boynton, 63 F.3d 337, 342, 344 (4th Cir. 1995); Knapp Shoes, Inc. v. Sylvania Shoe Mfg. 
Corp., 640 N.E.2d 1101, 1105 (Mass. 1994). 
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One likely explanation for this interpretive lethargy is the 
decades-long influence of Bowles v. Seminole Rock,30 which gives 
“controlling weight” to an agency interpretation so long as it is not 
“plainly erroneous or inconsistent with the regulation.”31 Accordingly, 
the judge is called upon first to interpret the regulation to determine 
whether it is indeed “plainly erroneous” or otherwise “inconsistent” 
with the agency’s interpretation; only then should she consider 
deferring to the agency’s construction.32 In practice, however, many 
judges have understood their review of an agency’s interpretation of 
its own regulations as requiring more deference than that granted to 
an agency’s interpretation of a statute.33 As a result, some judges have 
avoided the interpretive inquiry altogether, or else halfheartedly 
gestured toward tools drawn from the statutory context before simply 
capitulating to the agency’s view.34 The effect is that the 
overwhelming majority of cases of regulatory interpretation have 
resulted in an agency victory.35 
More recently, however, some academics and several members 
of the Supreme Court have begun to question such practices and have 
 
 30. Bowles v. Seminole Rock & Sand Co., 325 U.S. 410 (1945). 
 31. Auer v. Robbins, 519 U.S. 452, 461 (1997); Seminole Rock, 325 U.S. at 414. Seminole 
Rock deference is also sometimes referred to as Auer deference, though this Article will only 
refer to the former for consistency’s sake. See Stack, supra note 9, at 371 (“The most obvious 
place to turn for assistance with regulatory interpretation is the long-standing doctrine that an 
agency’s construction of its own regulation is controlling unless plainly erroneous or inconsistent 
with the regulation,” a doctrine “referred to as Seminole Rock deference.”).  
 32. Seminole Rock, 325 U.S. at 414.  
 33. See, e.g., Cathedral Candle Co. v. U.S. Int’l Trade Comm’n, 400 F.3d 1352, 1363–64 
(Fed. Cir. 2005) (“Deference to an agency’s interpretation of its own regulations is broader than 
deference to the agency’s construction of a statute, because in the latter case the agency is 
addressing Congress’ intentions, while in the former it is addressing its own.” (citing Am. 
Express Co. v. United States, 262 F.3d 1376, 1382–83 (Fed. Cir. 2001))).  
 34. See supra note 27; Noah, supra note 9 (noting that courts “frequently deflect[] the 
[interpretive] task altogether by simply deferring to an agency’s post-promulgation 
interpretation”); Stack, supra note 9, at 369 (“Even when the interpretation of a regulation 
receives explicit attention, an uncanny detachment characterizes the interpretive exercise: 
courts rely on principles of statutory interpretation without pausing or commenting on the 
justification for applying those principles to regulations . . . .”). 
 35. See William N. Eskridge, Jr. & Lauren E. Baer, The Continuum of Deference: Supreme 
Court Treatment of Agency Statutory Interpretations from Chevron to Hamdan, 96 GEO. L.J. 
1083, 1099 (2008) (observing a 90.9 percent agency win rate in a dataset of Seminole Rock cases 
from 1983 to 2005); Richard J. Pierce, Jr. & Joshua Weiss, An Empirical Study of Judicial 
Review of Agency Interpretations of Agency Rules, 63 ADMIN. L. REV. 515, 519 (2011) 
(determining that lower courts applying Auer and Seminole Rock upheld agency interpretations 
about 76 percent of the time in a sample of district and circuit court cases from January 1, 1999 
to December 31, 2001, and from January 1, 2005 to December 31, 2007).  
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noted the need for independent interpretive principles to govern 
regulatory texts.36 Much of their hesitation about the current state of 
affairs stems from the sense that an unreflective rule of deference has 
facilitated tenuous agency interpretations at the expense of fair notice 
and process.37 As a result, some scholars have advanced freestanding 
theories of regulatory interpretation, the most developed of which are 
currently either intentionalist or purposivist in orientation, though 
some have begun to consider textualist accounts as well.38 
Professor Kevin Stack, for example, has recently advanced a 
sophisticated interpretive method that he calls “regulatory 
purposivism.”39 Regulatory purposivism adapts Hart and Sacks’s 
statutory legal process theory to the rulemaking context.40 Because 
administrative law “requires regulators to act as reasonable persons, 
pursuing reasonable purposes within the permissible range of their 
discretion,”41 Stack argues that the role of the judge is to interpret a 
 
 36. See, e.g., Perez v. Mortg. Bankers Ass’n, 135 S. Ct. 1199, 1213 (2015) (Scalia, J., 
concurring) (advocating that Auer deference be “abandon[ed]”); id. at 1219 (Thomas, J., 
concurring) (arguing that “the entire line of precedent beginning with Seminole Rock raises 
serious constitutional questions and should be reconsidered”); Decker v. Nw. Envtl. Def. Ctr., 
133 S. Ct. 1326, 1338 (2013) (Roberts, C.J., concurring) (noting that “[i]t may be appropriate to 
reconsider [Auer and Seminole Rock] in an appropriate case”); Talk Am., Inc. v. Mich. Bell Tel. 
Co., 131 S. Ct. 2254, 2266 (2011) (Scalia, J., concurring) (announcing that “while I have in the 
past uncritically accepted [the Auer] rule, I have become increasingly doubtful of its validity”); 
Michael P. Healy, The Past, Present and Future of Auer Deference: Mead, Form and Function in 
Judicial Review of Agency Interpretations of Regulations, 62 U. KAN. L. REV. 633, 635 (2014) 
(arguing for a nondeferential standard of review of regulatory interpretation); Manning, supra 
note 19, at 617 (arguing “that the Justices’ new doubts about Seminole Rock are well founded, 
and that the Court should replace Seminole Rock with a standard that imposes an independent 
judicial check on the agency’s determination of regulatory meaning”).  
 37. See, e.g., Decker, 133 S. Ct. at 1341 (Scalia, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part) 
(noting that “when an agency interprets its own rules . . . the power to prescribe is augmented 
by the power to interpret; and the incentive is to speak vaguely and broadly, so as to retain a 
‘flexibility’ that will enable ‘clarification’ with retroactive effect”); Christopher v. SmithKline 
Beecham Corp., 132 S. Ct. 2156, 2168 (2012) (expressing concern that strong judicial deference 
“creates a risk that agencies will promulgate vague and open-ended regulations that they can 
later interpret as they see fit, thereby ‘frustrat[ing] the notice and predictability purposes of 
rulemaking’” (quoting Talk Am., Inc., 131 S. Ct. at 2254)). 
 38. See, e.g., Manning, supra note 19, at 659 (“Detailed consideration of the relative 
legitimacy and utility of particular approaches to textual construction is for another day.”).  
 39. See Stack, supra note 9, at 363. 
 40. See id. (defending “a purposive method of regulatory interpretation modeled on Hart 
and Sacks’s approach to statutory interpretation”); Kevin M. Stack, The Interpretive Dimension 
of Seminole Rock, 22 GEO. MASON L. REV. 669, 684 (2015) (further developing purposivist 
approach); cf. HENRY M. HART, JR. & ALBERT M. SACKS, THE LEGAL PROCESS (William N. 
Eskridge, Jr. & Philip P. Frickey eds., 1994).  
 41. Stack, supra note 9, at 397. 
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rule consistently with its statement of basis and purpose, otherwise 
known as the rule’s preamble.42 In his view, the statement of basis and 
purpose is not only a product of the rulemaking process, but also 
anchors the rule’s validity.43 As such, both the regulatory text and 
statement of basis and purpose should be understood as part of the 
same “regulatory act,” much like an enacted statutory statement of 
purpose.44 Stack accordingly calls for judges to consider the text with 
reference to the agency’s own understanding of its policy goals as 
reflected in “the rationale, objectives, and limits of the regulation” 
provided in the preamble.45 This approach, he argues, has numerous 
virtues including promoting judicial deference to the agency’s own 
“authoritative statement” of its aims,46 providing notice to regulated 
entities,47 optimizing the balance between agency flexibility and 
predictability,48 as well as reducing the possibility for “strategic 
manipulation” by agencies.49 
Purposive approaches like Stack’s generally recognize that 
rulemaking agencies may not be able to foresee every situation in 
which the regulation should be applied nor anticipate every changed 
circumstance. Thus, the judge should attempt to implement what the 
enacting agency was initially attempting to achieve.50 Proponents 
divide, however, as to the appropriate sources judges should consider 
to discern that purpose. For example, unlike Stack’s exclusive focus 
on the text and preamble, Professor Russell Weaver’s purposivism 
 
 42. Id. at 392 (arguing that “a goal of regulatory interpretation is to implement the purpose 
or aim of the regulation, and that the privileged interpretive sources are the regulatory text and 
accompanying statement of basis and purpose”); see also Kevin M. Stack, How to Interpret a 
Regulation: First Principles, REGBLOG (Feb. 11, 2013), http://www.regblog.org/2013/02/11/11-
stack-regulation-interpretation [http://perma.cc/9V8S-8MED]. 
 43. See Stack, supra note 9, at 380 (“[T]he statement of basis and purpose is not only joined 
to the text of the rule as the other principal product of the rulemaking proceeding, but it also 
provides the grounds for the validity of the rule.”). 
 44. See id. at 395. 
 45. Id. at 398. 
 46. See id. (arguing that his purposive approach “allocates a strong form of judicial 
deference, in the sense of judicial acceptance, to the agency’s own authoritative statement of the 
rationale, objectives, and limits of the regulation”). 
 47. Id. at 401 (noting that approach “avoids the central objections that textualists have 
made to purposivism, including . . . problems of fair notice”). 
 48. See id. at 414–16. 
 49. Id. at 416. 
 50. See Noah, supra note 9, at 264–65 (noting that “[p]roponents of dynamic interpretation 
start with the static text but strive to effectuate the purpose of the legislation and adapt it as 
necessary to deal with changed circumstances”).  
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welcomes a broader array of interpretive materials. Although he 
agrees that the text and preamble provide the best evidence of an 
agency’s regulatory objectives,51 Weaver argues that such sources can 
be indeterminate. Thus, he also invites judges to reference the 
“nature of the regulatory scheme,” the notice of proposed 
rulemaking, internal agency documents and memoranda, 
environmental impact statements, cost-benefit analyses, testimony by 
agency drafters, and canons of construction, among other materials.52 
Intentionalist approaches, by contrast, focus more heavily on the 
specific factual scenarios originally considered by the agency enacting 
the regulation. In this sense, proponents of intentionalism like 
Professor Lars Noah are more wary of the dangers of “dynamic” 
interpretation by judges “empowered to effectuate” the rule’s 
“purpose and adapt it as necessary to deal with changed 
circumstances.”53 Intentionalists are thus more eager to confine 
judicial regulatory interpretation to the actual circumstances initially 
considered by the agency as opposed to what judges perceive as the 
regulation’s broader objectives.  
One goal of this approach is to rein in the judge’s ability to adapt 
a regulation to new facts at higher levels of generality. As a result, 
Noah’s “original intent” approach privileges what the enacting agency 
explicitly considered in the record.54 Specifically, he first points to the 
final rule’s preamble as the “best” evidence of original intent, noting 
that such preambles have become more detailed as judicial scrutiny of 
them has increased over time.55 He then presents a hierarchy of other 
sources appropriate for the task, including regulatory analyses, 
 
 51. Weaver, supra note 9, at 696 (“To the extent that a regulation is ‘purposive,’ it is 
because an agency acted ‘purposively’ in creating it . . . . This fact is reflected in the APA, which 
requires that every final rule promulgated during an informal rulemaking set forth its ‘basis and 
purpose.’’’); see id. at 698 (“The relevant purposes, whether immediate or ulterior, are those 
held by the agency . . . . In the informal rulemaking process, the agency typically will state the 
‘purpose’—the primary ulterior purpose—of the regulation in a document accompanying the 
final rule.”); see also id. at 711 (stating that, as he had “noted above,” “the preamble to the final 
rule must contain a ‘concise statement [of its] basis and purpose’”(alteration in original)).  
 52. See id.at 709–21. 
 53. Noah, supra note 9, at 264–65.  
 54. See id. at 260. 
 55. Id. at 306 (observing that “when they do inquire about the agency’s original intent, 
courts usually refer only to the preamble accompanying the final rule, which represents the best 
but hardly only useful source of guidance”); id. at 309–10 (noting that “[a]s courts became more 
demanding in their substantive review of rules adopted through notice-and-comment 
procedures . . . [p]reambles for especially controversial rules may respond in detail to public 
comments in anticipation of defending against a judicial challenge”). 
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notices of proposed rulemaking, internal agency memoranda, and 
even the “recollections” of those involved in the rule’s formulation.56 
B. Evaluating Intentionalism and Purposivism 
Both intentionalism and purposivism, however, fall prey to a 
number of regulation-specific worries that ultimately counsel against 
their adoption. These concerns include the court’s inability to locate 
regulatory intent or purpose consistently, the comparative 
competencies between agencies and courts, and the general potential 
for strategic interpretive behavior by rulemaking agencies. 
Accordingly, one way to understand the relevant problem is in terms 
of determining which interpretive method is likely to best balance or 
trade off among these various considerations.57  
1. The Identification Problem.  Legal realists and public choice 
theorists alike have effectively undermined the notion that 
multimember institutions like administrative agencies possess a 
singular, identifiable intent or purpose.58 In this view, it is unlikely for 
the myriad actors involved in the regulatory process to possess some 
collective intent when issuing a regulation, and even less likely that 
judges could discover this intent, even if it existed. This insight is 
perhaps most straightforward as applied to independent agencies 
 
 56. Id. at 307; see also id. at 320–21 (discussing how “agency officials may have to testify 
about their decisionmaking where necessary to provide a record for judicial review”). 
 57. Given that optimizing over all of these dimensions may be impossible due to resource-
related or other constraints, the search may ultimately be for second-best interpretive solutions. 
See VERMEULE, supra note 18, at 80–81 (arguing that it “is impossible to derive interpretive 
rules directly from first-best principles without answering second-best questions about 
institutional performance”); Frederick Schauer, Statutory Construction and the Coordinating 
Function of Plain Meaning, 1990 SUP. CT. REV. 231, 256 (when interpreting statutes, turning 
attention “to the contingent optimality of sub-optimizing decision procedures, and to the 
circumstances in which the second-best is the best we can do”).  
 58. See Noah, supra note 9, at 280–81 (“Much like the criticized fiction of a discoverable 
legislative intent, the notion of a single and authoritative administrative intent encounters some 
conceptual difficulties” such as the fact that “[m]any agency officials may have a hand in the 
formulation of a legislative rule” and with “multi-member commissions, these problems become 
still trickier.”); Stack, supra note 9, at 401 (“Relying on public choice theory, textualists argue 
that legislation frequently lacks a purpose other than that ascertainable in the text.”); cf. 
KENNETH J. ARROW, SOCIAL CHOICE AND INDIVIDUAL VALUES 22–24 (2d ed. 1963); Herz, 
supra note 23, at 94–104; Saul Levmore, Ambiguous Statutes, 77 U. CHI. L. REV. 1073, 1075–76 
(2010); Max Radin, Statutory Interpretation, 43 HARV. L. REV. 863, 869–72 (1930); Kenneth A. 
Shepsle, Congress is a ‘They,’ Not an ‘It’: Legislative Intent as Oxymoron, 12 INT’L REV. L. & 
ECON. 239, 239 (1992). 
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headed by multimember commissions or boards.59 Individual 
commissioners may vote for a regulation for any number of reasons—
to change a policy, to curry favor with a colleague, or to appease a 
potential future employer. Thus, to impute some subjective intent to 
their aggregate vote would indulge a legal fiction; legal fictions, in 
turn, can foster judicial creativity. 
Perhaps less obviously, the concern is also relevant to single-
headed executive agencies, particularly those required by executive 
order to submit significant regulations to the Office of Information 
and Regulatory Affairs (OIRA) for review. Although the hierarchical 
structure of such agencies renders the notion of intent more 
plausible,60 the concept is complicated by the realities of the OIRA-
coordinated review process. The interactions between the agency 
head and White House actors can result in changes to a regulation 
that render it difficult for an external actor, like a judge, to separate 
the subjective intent of the agency head from other members of the 
President’s administration.61 An agency head signing off on a 
regulation could have a different intent than that of the President or 
OIRA administrator because of bureaucratic capture, her 
relationship with Congress, or diverging amounts of information and 
expertise.62 Although some might argue that it should be the intent of 
the statutory delegate that should ultimately matter,63 others would 
point out that, even still, the lines between the intent of the agency 
 
 59. See Noah, supra note 9, at 280–81 (noting difficulties of discerning intent from 
multimember commissions)  
 60. See id. at 281 (noting that a “hierarchical structure and duty of explanation 
distinguishes all administrative agencies from the collective decisionmaking process of a 
legislature”). 
 61. See Lisa Heinzerling, Who Will Run the EPA?, 30 YALE J. ON REG. ONLINE 39, 39 
(2013) (noting that through the “longstanding practice of White House control over EPA 
rules . . . EPA rules deemed major by OMB are not issued without OMB’s imprimatur,” thus 
allowing “the OMB director [to] become the EPA Administrator’s boss”). 
 62. See Nicholas Bagley & Richard L. Revesz, Centralized Oversight of the Regulatory 
State, 106 COLUM. L. REV. 1260, 1302–03 (2006); Michael E. Levine & Jennifer L. Forrence, 
Regulatory Capture, Public Interest, and the Public Agenda: Toward a Synthesis, 6 J.L. ECON. & 
ORG. 167, 169 (1990).  
 63. Cf. Kevin M. Stack, The President’s Statutory Powers to Administer the Laws, 106 
COLUM. L. REV. 263, 267 (2006) (arguing that “as a matter of statutory construction the 
President has directive authority—that is, the power to act directly under the statute or to bind 
the discretion of lower level officials—only when the statute expressly grants power to the 
President in name”). But see Elena Kagan, Presidential Administration, 114 HARV. L. REV. 
2245, 2319–31 (2001). This is, of course, not to confuse a potential extension of Stack’s views on 
presidential directive authority with his views on regulatory interpretation, which are discussed 
in more detail here.  
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head and the President are often blurred in practice.64 Such worries 
would be compounded by the wealth of regulatory history upon 
which some, like Noah, would allow judges to rely as evidence of 
agency intent. The broader the palette from which the judge can 
draw, the more convincing the resulting picture. 
Confronted with these concerns, some intentionalists and 
purposivists would respond that what is important is not the 
subjective intent of particular regulatory actors, but rather the 
agency’s objective intent or purpose. Stack makes this argument 
perhaps more forcefully, recall, contending that judges should 
attempt to discern the objective public purpose of the agency as 
found in the rule’s statement of basis and purpose.65 In his view, such 
statements are akin to “enacted statement[s] of purpose in a statute” 
in that they have been “duly agreed-upon” by actors within the 
agency.66 The preamble can thus be thought of as part of the 
regulatory text, which has also gone through the appropriate 
authorizing procedures.67 As a result, the judge has a readily available 
source from which to identify the rule’s explicit official purpose, thus 
mitigating the criticism that a search for regulatory purpose is an 
incoherent and ultimately fruitless exercise. 
Though Stack convincingly demonstrates that regulatory 
purposivism is more immune to the criticisms often leveled at 
statutory purposivism, he has not rebutted them sufficiently to 
counsel full-scale adoption. First, his attempt to analogize agency 
statements of basis and purpose to enacted statutory statements of 
purpose fails to leave conceptual room for statements of purpose that 
are actually codified into the regulatory text itself—a more precise 
 
 64. See Peter L. Strauss, Foreword: Overseer, or “The Decider”? The President in 
Administrative Law, 75 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 696, 704 (2007) (“The difference between 
oversight and decision can be subtle, particularly when the important transactions occur behind 
closed doors and among political compatriots who value loyalty and understand that the 
President who selected them is their democratically chosen leader.”); Cass R. Sunstein, The 
Office of Information and Regulatory Affairs: Myths and Realities, 126 HARV. L. REV. 1838, 
1874 n.126 (2013) (noting “[t]here is a great deal of academic discussion about whether the 
President may ‘overrule’ those within the executive branch, including Cabinet heads, who may 
be delegated a degree of statutory discretion” but arguing that the “issue has more theoretical 
interest than practical importance” since “those who work for the President want to act 
consistently with his goals, priorities, and views”). 
 65. See Stack, supra note 9, at 361–62. 
 66. Id. at 402. 
 67. Id.; see also id. at 407 (“In a sense, the suggestion is that both regulatory text and the 
regulation’s statement of basis and purpose count as part of the ‘text’ on which a textualist 
should center her interpretive inquiry.”). 
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analogy. Indeed, agencies often place statements of purpose directly 
into the codified regulatory text to clarify the purpose of the 
regulation beyond the general, abstract language found in the APA-
required statement of basis and purpose.68 In these circumstances, the 
judge is once again confronted with the problem of how to choose 
among competing statements of purpose. 
Second, as a descriptive matter, agencies often list multiple 
purposes in their preambles, both in the general introductory 
language as well as in the particular provision-by-provision 
explanations. Sometimes, these various stated objectives will track the 
multiple perceived goals of the authorizing statute.69 They could also 
reflect the agency’s attempt to trade off between many conflicting 
considerations or, more generally, to balance various benefits and 
costs.70 Though administrative-law doctrines undoubtedly “press” 
agencies to rationalize regulations,71 the rulemaking process is 
frequently dominated by rent-seeking interest groups that often 
succeed in wresting concessions from captured administrators.72 
 
 68. See, e.g., Standards for Accredited Veterinarians, 51 Fed. Reg. 45,874, 45,876 (Dec. 23, 
1986) (to be codified at 9 C.F.R. pt. 161) (presenting “Statement of Purpose” as part of the 
regulatory text); Assessment of Mediation and Arbitration Procedures, 78 Fed. Reg. 29,071, 
29,080 (May 17, 2013) (to be codified at 49 C.F.R. pt. 1108) (same). 
 69. See STACK, supra note 12, at 36 (“Rather than providing an independent assessment of 
the purpose of the rule in light of the statute, some preambles state the purpose of their 
regulations in terms that largely mirror statutory language.”); see, e.g., Applications for FDA 
Approval to Market a New Drug: Patent Listing Requirements and Application of 30-Month 
Stays on Approval of Abbreviated New Drug Applications Certifying That a Patent Claiming a 
Drug Is Invalid or Will Not be Infringed, 67 Fed. Reg. 65,448, 65,459 (Oct. 24, 2002) (to be 
codified at 21 C.F.R. pt. 314) (noting that the rule had “multiple objectives” that attempted to 
“preserv[e] the balance struck in the Hatch-Waxman Amendments between encouraging 
innovation and encouraging the availability of generic drugs”). 
 70. See, e.g., Food Labeling; Health Messages and Label Statements; Reproposed Rule, 55 
Fed. Reg. 5176, 5178–79 (Feb. 13, 1990) (to be codified at 21 C.F.R. pt. 101) (describing the 
rules as “intended to help achieve . . . multiple objectives” and strike the right “balance” 
between the various goals of preventing consumer misleading, protecting the public health, as 
well as ensuring equal treatment of all competitors); Standards for Remedial Actions at Inactive 
Uranium Processing Sites, 48 Fed. Reg. 590, 590 (Jan. 5, 1983) (to be codified at 40 C.F.R. pt. 
192) (“We have therefore made it our objective to establish standards that take account of the 
tradeoffs between costs and benefits in a way that assures adequate protection of the public 
health, safety, and the environment; that can be implemented using presently available 
techniques and measuring instruments; and that are reasonable in terms of overall costs and 
benefits.”). 
 71. Stack, supra note 9, at 403. 
 72. See Kimberly D. Krawiec, Don’t “Screw Joe the Plummer”: The Sausage-Making of 
Financial Reform, 55 ARIZ. L. REV. 53, 58–59 (2013) (finding that financial institutions and 
trade groups dominated early meetings with the agencies responsible for implementation of the 
Dodd-Frank Act); Wendy E. Wagner, Administrative Law, Filter Failure, and Information 
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Administrators can nonetheless still justify the resulting regulation as 
a reasonable effort to balance a number of statutorily authorized 
considerations. As a result, a judge could characterize the purpose of 
a regulation or a specific provision in many different ways, all of 
which seem consistent with the regulatory preamble.73 
Finally, given that rulemaking preambles contain both abstract 
statements of purpose as well as provision-by-provision descriptions, 
there are also still-remaining questions of how to relate the specific 
justifications to the more general.74 Should the general provisions be 
used when only the specific justifications are otherwise ambiguous? 
Should the specific explanations always be read in light of the broader 
statements of purpose, in which case the latter could potentially 
expand the relevant level of generality? In this manner, purposivism 
suffers from an identification problem and the resulting risk that a 
judge will invoke a regulation’s purpose to implement a favored 
policy preference. 
2. Institutional Capacity.  Intentionalism and purposivism will 
also increase decision costs—the time and resources required for 
judges to engage in regulatory interpretation—as well as the risk of 
interpretive errors, the probability that an interpretation will be 
flawed.75 Indeed, approaches that invite judges to consult a capacious 
array of sources will require higher decision costs relative to more 
restrictive interpretive methods, since rulemaking records are usually 
voluminous. They are replete with documents on narrow subjects 
 
Capture, 59 DUKE L.J. 1321, 1333–34 (2010) (“Even when agency staff can withstand the 
technical minutia coming at them at high speed and under tight time constraints, they face an 
administrative record that is badly lopsided, and threats of lawsuits against the substance of 
their regulation that come predominantly from only one sector (industry).”). 
 73. Cf. Cass R. Sunstein, Interpreting Statutes in the Regulatory State, 103 HARV. L. REV. 
405, 428 (1989) (“In some cases, the purpose might be characterized in many ways, all of which 
are faithful to the original enactment. The act of characterization is therefore one of invention 
rather than discovery.”). 
 74. Stack, supra note 9, at 405–06 (stating that “[t]o the extent that a statement of basis and 
purpose typically includes both a general statement of the purpose of the regulation as well as 
provision-by-provision justifications they will inform the level of generality of the regulation or 
its particular provisions” but acknowledging that “[i]nterpretive work will remain”). 
 75. See NEIL K. KOMESAR, IMPERFECT ALTERNATIVES: CHOOSING INSTITUTIONS IN 
LAW, ECONOMICS, AND PUBLIC POLICY 123–50 (1994); VERMEULE, supra note 18, at 129–30; 
Stack, supra note 9, at 403 (discussing considerations related to the “distinctive risks of error for 
time-pressed generalist judges”); Cass R. Sunstein, Problems with Rules, 83 CALIF. L. REV. 953, 
972–73 (1995); Emerson H. Tiller & Pablo T. Spiller, Strategic Instruments: Legal Structure and 
Political Games in Administrative Law, 15 J.L. ECON. & ORG. 349, 351 (1999); Adrian 
Vermeule, Interpretive Choice, 75 N.Y.U. L. REV. 74, 129–30 (2000). 
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likely unfamiliar to the generalist judge: staff memoranda, proposed 
rules, the final regulatory text, advisory committee hearings, 
regulatory and environmental impact analyses, preambles, public 
comments, presidential statements, and more.76 Some of these 
materials appear early in the rulemaking process, but are later 
superseded. Some reflect views that have been outright rejected by 
authoritative decision makers.77 These institutional dynamics are 
likely to be difficult for judges (or other outsiders) to appreciate, 
especially if they have never worked in an administrative agency. 
Intentionalist and purposivist approaches also create more 
opportunities for judicial error because they ask judges to engage in 
inquiries for which they are ill-suited. Specifically, both 
methodologies require judges to determine whether the current 
agency’s action indeed furthers the agency’s implied or stated 
objective. These decisions require knowledge and data about the 
expected consequences of the challenged agency action—information 
which judges are unlikely to have access to, let alone be equipped to 
evaluate competently. As a result, these approaches ask judges to 
engage in a form of means-end reasoning that implicates complicated 
questions of fact78 and policy judgments that stretch beyond the kinds 
of determinations that judges should make.  
Judges, like all interpreters, have fixed resource constraints as 
well as limited institutional capacities. By contrast to agency actors, 
judges are generalists who lack the training and resources to gather 
and analyze large amounts of data or otherwise adapt regulatory 
policies to new circumstances. In addition, the judge may also have to 
determine questions of degree: would granting the permit advance 
the purpose of the regulation to the same extent as the initial 
rulemaking contemplated and, if not, how much more or less, and 
 
 76. See Noah, supra note 9, at 306–21 (surveying examples of regulatory history).  
 77. See San Luis Obispo Mothers for Peace v. U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Comm’n, 789 F.2d 
26, 33–34 (D.C. Cir. 1986) (rejecting staff documents as interpretive sources for a Nuclear 
Regulatory Commission rule on the grounds that the agency’s commission was “required to 
make its own [authoritative] finding”).  
 78. See Cass R. Sunstein, Commentary, On Analogical Reasoning, 106 HARV. L. REV. 741, 
758 (1993) (arguing that “[m]eans-ends rationality should play a large role in law . . . for 
example, legislatures and judges should anticipate the effects of their decisions on, among other 
things, the allocation and distribution of resources,” but also noting that “[c]onventional legal 
tools are ill-suited to this task”); cf. Herz, supra note 23, at 99 (regarding statutory 
interpretation, observing that “even if there is such a thing as an identifiable legislative purpose, 
courts are ill-equipped to determine which interpretation of a statute will most effectively 
advance that purpose”). 
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what amount is acceptable? As courts have observed in the statutory 
context, “no legislation pursues its purposes at all costs.”79 The same 
is true of regulations. 
Such error and decision costs are likely to be exacerbated by the 
fact that judges also face a number of other epistemic constraints 
unique to the regulatory context. Under the Freedom of Information 
Act, for instance, predecisional and deliberative materials within 
administrative agencies are protected from disclosure.80 Agencies do 
not routinely publish internal staff memoranda and messages, 
although they can be placed voluntarily into the regulatory docket.81 
Judicial doctrines also shield agency interactions with the White 
House.82 Although executive orders require agencies to “make 
available to the public all documents exchanged between OIRA and 
the agency during the review by OIRA,” the provision is not robustly 
followed or enforced in practice.83 The disclosure requirements also 
only apply after the final rule has been published in the Federal 
Register and exclude any communications before the formal review 
process begins.84 As a result, any judicial inquiry into an agency’s 
actual intent or purpose is likely to be stymied by the limited kinds of 
information available in the rulemaking record. 
Relatedly, judges must often examine the materials that do make 
it into the record without the knowledge required to comprehend that 
agency’s specific procedural idiosyncrasies. Some agencies, for 
example, use different naming practices to denote various stages in 
the rulemaking process. The Department of Treasury, for instance, 
labels general-authority regulations as “interpretative rules,” even 
though they are legally binding and thus “legislative” in 
administrative law terminology, a quirk that has caused a great deal 
 
 79. See, e.g., Rodriguez v. United States, 480 U.S. 522, 525–26 (1987) (per curiam) (“[N]o 
legislation pursues its purposes at all costs.”); see also David M. Driesen, Purposeless 
Construction, 48 WAKE FOREST L. REV. 97, 148 (2013) (“The Court has offered plausible 
reasons to give statutory goals little weight in statutory construction cases. Congress never 
pursues its goals to the exclusion of all competing considerations.”). 
 80. 5 U.S.C. § 552(b)(5) (1994). 
 81. Noah, supra note 9, at 320. 
 82. See Sierra Club v. Costle, 657 F.2d 298, 403, 406–08 (D.C. Cir. 1981) (holding that 
courts could determine only whether an agency decision was supported by its public record and 
explanation, and not by the agency’s informal ex parte deliberations with the White House). 
 83. See Nina A. Mendelson, Disclosing “Political” Oversight of Agency Decision Making, 
108 MICH. L. REV. 1127, 1148–54, 1164 (2010).  
 84. Exec. Order No. 12,866 § 6(b)(4)(D), 3 C.F.R. 638, 645 (1993). 
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of jurisprudential confusion in tax litigation.85 Such confusion is only 
augmented by the technical jargon and acronyms that litter the 
rulemaking landscape, spurring one recent, frustrated D.C. Circuit 
panel to issue an order to parties to “submit briefs that eliminate 
uncommon acronyms used on their previously filed briefs.”86 Broad 
consultation of the rulemaking record also raises aggregate litigation 
costs as parties will be forced to grapple with voluminous 
administrative materials and to rebut evidence drawn from them. The 
resulting strategic presentations of the records, in turn, will be costly 
for judges to independently evaluate and sort. 
To be sure, some of these institutional concerns are mitigated for 
specialized courts like the D.C. Circuit, which has more experience 
reading regulatory materials than other circuits and thus may require 
less effort to comb through rulemaking records. Even then, at least in 
recent years, the D.C. Circuit has only heard about 40 percent of 
cases involving agency review, still leaving 60 percent to be heard by 
less-experienced courts.87 Moreover, agency personnel and 
procedures are constantly evolving alongside technological or other 
substantive policy changes, thus mitigating the benefits of 
specialization over time. 
3. Strategic Self-Delegation.  Finally, competing theories of 
regulatory interpretation should also consider the extent to which 
alternative approaches can reduce the ability of agencies to 
strategically self-delegate rulemaking power.88 In particular, as 
Professor John Manning has emphasized, two aspects of 
 
 85. See Kristin E. Hickman, Coloring Outside the Lines: Examining Treasury’s (Lack of) 
Compliance with Administrative Procedure Act Rulemaking Requirements, 82 NOTRE DAME L. 
REV. 1727, 1761–73 (2007) (providing examples). 
 86. See Order, Ill. Pub. Telecoms. Ass’n v. FCC, 752 F.3d 1018 (D.C. Cir. 2014) (No. 13-
1059), http://www.scribd.com/doc/214437589/Ipta-v-Fcc-Order [http://perma.cc/PP6S-GCPZ].  
 87. Douglas H. Ginsburg, Remarks Upon Receiving the Lifetime Service Award of the 
Georgetown Federalist Society Chapter, 10 GEO. J.L. & PUB. POL’Y 1, 3 (2012) (“[P]etitions for 
review of administrative decisions filed in the D.C. Circuit have increased from twenty-eight 
percent of the national total in 1986 to a high of thirty-eight percent in 2007 and thirty-six 
percent in 2010.”); John M. Golden, The Federal Circuit and the D.C. Circuit: Comparative 
Trials of Two Semi-Specialized Courts, 78 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 553, 553 n.2 (2010); John G. 
Roberts, Jr., What Makes the D.C. Circuit Different? A Historical View, 92 VA. L. REV. 375, 
376–77 (2006). 
 88. See Manning, supra note 19, at 657 (stating that “if an agency issues an imprecise or 
vague regulation, it does so secure in the knowledge that it can insist upon an unobvious 
interpretation, so long as its choice is not ‘plainly erroneous’”); Matthew C. Stephenson & Miri 
Pogoriler, Seminole Rock’s Domain, 79 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 1449, 1460–61 (2011). 
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administrative law currently facilitate an agency’s ability to draft 
intentionally ambiguous regulatory texts with the hopes of refining or 
changing its regulatory policies with minimal judicial oversight.89 First, 
the APA exempts “interpretative rules” and “general statements of 
policy” from traditional notice-and-comment requirements.90 These 
exempted documents, sometimes referred to as “non-legislative 
rules,” often construe agency regulations in manuals or by simple 
postings on the agency’s website.91 Although some agencies will 
voluntarily engage in some minimal form of public comment before 
issuing such documents, most are released without any formal 
procedure.92 Second, recall that Seminole Rock affords considerable 
deference to the agency’s interpretation of its own regulations. When 
an agency interprets a legislative rule that it promulgated, there is 
relatively minimal judicial oversight. Because of these two features of 
the current legal landscape, the agency faces few ex ante procedural 
requirements to issue a regulatory interpretation, as well as a minimal 
judicial check on the interpretations it issues.93 
As a result, after an agency promulgates a legislative rule 
through notice and comment, it can then continuously revise its 
interpretations without meaningful notice to regulated entities and 
with little judicial accountability. Such concerns echo the more 
constitutionally grounded critiques highlighted by Manning and other 
 
 89. See Manning, supra note 19, at 657; Stephenson & Pogoriler, supra note 88, at 1461 
(“Seminole Rock could enable agencies to adopt legally binding norms without either the ex 
ante constraint of meaningful procedural safeguards or the ex post check of rigorous judicial 
review.”).  
 90. 5 U.S.C. § 553(b)(3)(A) (2012); see also Stephenson & Pogoriler, supra note 88, at 
1460–61 (discussing relevant features of APA). 
 91. Nonlegislative rules are often also referred to as “guidance documents.” See, e.g., Nina 
A. Mendelson, Regulatory Beneficiaries and Informal Agency Policymaking, 92 CORNELL L. 
REV. 397, 399 (2007) (“Guidance documents can closely resemble legislative rules, leading some 
to call them ‘nonlegislative rules.’”). Legislative rules, in turn, are understood as those required 
to undergo notice and comment, whether or not such procedures were actually used. See Robert 
A. Anthony, “Interpretive” Rules, “Legislative” Rules and “Spurious” Rules: Lifting the Smog, 8 
ADMIN. L.J. AM. U. 1, 2–3 (1994); David L. Franklin, Legislative Rules, Nonlegislative Rules, 
and the Perils of the Short Cut, 120 YALE L.J. 276, 286 (2010). 
 92. See, e.g., Lars Noah, The FDA’s New Policy on Guidelines: Having Your Cake and 
Eating It Too, 47 CATH. U. L. REV. 113, 138 n.100 (1997) (noting FDA’s “voluntary adherence 
to notice-and-comment procedures” for its interpretive rules and statements of policy).  
 93. See Manning, supra note 19, at 618 (“By providing the agency an incentive to 
promulgate imprecise and vague rules, Seminole Rock undercuts important deliberative process 
objectives of the APA, and it creates potential problems of inadequate notice and arbitrariness 
in the enforcement of agency rules.”); Stephenson & Pogoriler, supra note 88, at 1461. 
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legal scholars.94 Manning’s assessment starts from the premise that 
when agencies issue legislative rules, they are engaging in a 
lawmaking function.95 Allowing the same agency to then interpret and 
apply those rules—what Manning calls “law-exposition”—violates 
important separation-of-powers principles that serve to protect 
against arbitrary coercion.96 Ensuring that different institutional 
actors engage in lawmaking and law-exposition, by contrast, gives 
rule writers the incentive to write clear and specific limits on that 
power.97 Thus, courts should play a more robust role in policing the 
agency’s ability to combine these distinct powers. 
To illustrate, consider Decker v. Northwest Environmental 
Defense Center,98 a case challenging the EPA’s interpretation of its 
own regulation regarding the application of an exception from the 
Clean Water Act for stormwater discharges alongside logging roads.99 
Suffice to say that the regulatory text was ambiguous.100 During the 
course of litigation, however, the EPA was able to amend the 
regulatory text quickly to conform to its litigating position and 
provide greater clarity, a fact that Justice Antonin Scalia noted when 
he declined to defer to the EPA’s interpretation.101 Specifically, the 
lower court handed down an adverse decision in May 2011, but by 
December 2012, the EPA had amended the regulations after a full 
notice-and-comment process. 
Given the backdrop of the APA and Seminole Rock deference, 
regulatory interpretation should thus consider the extent to which 
competing interpretive approaches can reduce the ability of agencies 
to self-delegate strategically. A theory of interpretation should be 
 
 94. See, e.g., Manning, supra note 19, at 631–80; see also Stephenson & Pogoriler, supra 
note 88, at 1460–61. 
 95. See Manning, supra note 19, at 655; see also Ariz. Grocery Co. v. Atchinson, T. & Santa 
Fe Ry., 284 U.S. 370, 386 (1932) (characterizing a rulemaking agency as a body that “speaks as 
the legislature” with “pronouncement[s that have] the force of a statute”). 
 96. See Manning, supra note 19, at 631 (“By permitting agencies both to write regulations 
and to construe them authoritatively, Seminole Rock effectively unifies lawmaking and law-
exposition—a combination of powers decisively rejected by our constitutional structure.”). 
 97. Id. at 647. 
 98. Decker v. Nw. Envtl. Def. Ctr., 133 S. Ct. 1326 (2013). 
 99. Id. at 1330–31. 
 100. See id. at 1334. 
 101. More specifically, Justice Scalia objected to what he perceived as the agency’s initial 
attempt to subvert the notice-and-comment process through interpretation. Id. at 1341–42 
(Scalia, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part) (citing 77 Fed. Reg. 72,974 (Dec. 7, 2012) 
(to be codified at 40 C.F.R. pt. 122)). 
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sensitive to the ways in which it could permit agencies to promulgate 
textual “mush,” and then allow such ambiguities to justify later 
deference.102 Put in doctrinal terms, different kinds of interpretive 
approaches can enlarge or truncate the number of seemingly 
“consistent” interpretations later granted “controlling weight” under 
Seminole Rock. The more an interpretive approach can reduce the 
discretion available to subsequent interpreters, the more it can reduce 
an agency’s ex ante ability to issue overly broad regulatory texts.103 
Whether or not intentionalism or purposivism will result in 
greater permissible interpretations will depend on many factors, 
including both the number of conflicting statements among the 
available interpretive sources as well as their respective degrees of 
ambiguity. The concern is particularly acute for those interpretive 
approaches that invite broad consultation of the regulatory history, as 
the modern administrative record often spans different and likely 
conflicting administrators and various levels of an agency’s hierarchy. 
Although the average rulemaking time currently hovers at just above 
a year,104 some regulations, like the Occupational Safety and Health 
Administration’s ergonomics rule, have required more than a decade 
to promulgate.105 As a result, those documents not shielded by 
deliberative privilege106 can often reflect disagreements between 
regulatory actors with varying partisan affiliations or otherwise 
clashing views of the evidence. 
By contrast, the more specific, consistent, and structured the set 
of available sources, the less the amount of interpretive leeway. Thus, 
Stack’s version of regulatory purposivism, for example, mitigates the 
potential for strategic self-delegation relative to broader forms of 
 
 102. Paralyzed Veterans of Am. v. D.C. Arena L.P., 117 F.3d 579, 584 (D.C. Cir. 1997) (“A 
substantive regulation must have sufficient content and definitiveness as to be a meaningful 
exercise in agency lawmaking. It is certainly not open to an agency to promulgate mush and 
then give it concrete form only through subsequent less formal ‘interpretations.’”). 
 103. See Stack, supra note 9, at 412 (observing that “[i]f the interpretive approach increases 
the requirements for what counts as a permissible construction of the regulation, deference 
under Seminole Rock will be triggered less often”). 
 104. See Anne Joseph O’Connell, Agency Rulemaking and Political Transitions, 105 NW. U. 
L. REV. 471, 513 (2011) (finding that, between the fall of 1983 and the spring of 2010, the 
average rulemaking took 462.79 days to complete). 
 105. See Stuart Shapiro, The Role of Procedural Controls in OSHA’s Ergonomics 
Rulemaking, 67 PUB. ADMIN. REV. 688, 691 (2007) (describing OSHA’s efforts to require 
employers to reduce musculoskeletal disorders). 
 106. 5 U.S.C. § 552(b)(5) (1994) (providing an exception to the Freedom of Information Act 
for “inter-agency or intra-agency memorandums or letters which would not be available by law 
to a party other than an agency in litigation with the agency”). 
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intentionalism and purposivism.107 At the same time, however, his 
approach is still subject to the overarching concern that agencies 
could attempt to self-delegate by increasing the level of generality at 
which judges consider the regulatory text. Specifically, agencies could 
choose to insert broad language into the preamble, particularly in the 
normally abstract language found in the introduction, or else the 
statements of purpose that agencies often place directly into the 
codified regulatory text. Though Stack’s approach would consider the 
specific provisions to help “inform the level of generality of the 
regulation or its particular provisions,”108 it would still require 
“synthetic” judgments on the part of the interpreter when relating the 
specific to the general provisions, or when more specific provisions 
are otherwise unavailable for addressing the particular ambiguity at 
issue.109 Thus, reliance on the entire statement of basis and purpose 
continues to raise concerns about the ability of agencies to 
strategically self-delegate. 
II.  REGULATORY TEXTUALISM 
Because intentionalism and purposivism suffer from 
identification problems, misconceive judicial capacities, and fail to 
mitigate sufficiently agencies’ abilities to self-delegate, they should be 
rejected in favor of a stricter theory more suited to the institutional 
capacity of the courts. Such an approach should better cabin judges’ 
discretion, reduce their decision and error costs, and help to police 
substantive policy changes that amount to new legislative rules. One 
natural alternative to consider is a method that centers on the 
semantic meaning of the regulatory text. This Part examines what 
form of textualism is the most appropriate for regulatory 
interpretation and why. With its focus on the public understanding of 
 
 107. See Stack, supra note 9, at 412 (noting that attention to regulatory interpretation at the 
first step of Seminole Rock “clearly reduces the set of permissible interpretations of a 
regulation,” while interpreting the regulation in light of the statement of basis and purpose 
“does so in a way that enhances fair notice” because “[r]egulated parties and regulatory 
beneficiaries have access to the agency’s statements justifying the regulation”); id. at 416 
(discussing potential for agencies to engage in “strategic manipulation”). 
 108. Id. at 405–06. 
 109. Id. at 403 (acknowledging objections to purposivism’s potential demand for “synthetic 
and creative judgment” but arguing that objection does “not apply with the same force to 
purposive interpretation of regulation” given greater specificity of preamble); id. at 414–15 
(“Because the agency creates the rule’s statement of basis and purpose, it can choose to impose 
greater or lesser constraints on the rule’s scope by the way in which it crafts the statement of 
basis and purpose.”). 
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the words ratified by multiple regulatory actors, textualism rightly 
draws the interpreter’s attention to the objective meaning of the 
regulation’s legally binding words.110 Regulatory textualism, as 
understood here, also leaves agencies to pursue more intentionalist or 
purposivist interpretations through Seminole Rock’s rule of judicial 
deference when the regulatory text is otherwise ambiguous. 
A. Reassessing the Stakes 
Textualism, like intentionalism and purposivism, is best 
understood as an interpretive orientation rather than as a reference to 
a single method or source. There are, in other words, many textualist 
approaches with family resemblances.111 Analogizing from the 
statutory arena, one school of textualists argues that judges should 
seek to disambiguate language by discerning the abstract meaning of 
every word, despite any conflicting contextual evidence suggesting 
more appropriate usages. Such textualists generally search for a 
single, correct linguistic meaning, which is self-evident or otherwise 
“plain.”112 Because “plain” meaning refers to a text’s semantic 
content, judges are often directed to discern such meaning only by 
reference to dictionaries, textual canons, or other similar tools.113 
 
 110. Cf. Larry Kramer, Two (More) Problems with Originalism, 31 HARV. J.L. & PUB. 
POL’Y 907, 910 (2008) (drawing analogy between “public meaning” arguments in statute and 
constitutional contexts, which concern “how those [constitutional and statutory] words are or 
ought to be understood by the relevant audience”). 
 111. See LUDWIG WITTGENSTEIN, PHILOSOPHICAL INVESTIGATIONS 32 (P.M.S. Hacker & 
Joachim Schulte eds., G.E.M. Anscombe trans., Wiley-Blackwell rev. 4th ed. 2009) (1953) 
(deeming it unnecessary to identify one single feature of a “game” and instead noting that many 
instantiations of the term share “family resemblances”); Molot, supra note 21, at 37 (discussing 
the intellectual history of textualism as a product of changing “views of judging,” “constitutional 
structure,” and whether “law is viewed as indeterminate or determinate”). See generally 
Andrew Tutt, Fifty Shades of Textualism, 29 J.L. & POL. 309 (2014). 
 112. See Frederick Schauer, The Practice and Problems of Plain Meaning: A Response to 
Aleinikoff and Shaw, 45 VAND. L. REV. 715, 729–32 (1992). 
 113. See Ellen P. Aprill, The Law of the Word: Dictionary Shopping in the Supreme Court, 
30 ARIZ. ST. L.J. 275, 280 (1998) (observing that “when the Justices see the statutory language 
as unambiguous, textualist opinions . . . refer to ‘plain meaning,’ sometimes citing to dictionaries 
to show the meaning is plain, and sometimes simply asserting it as such”); William N. Eskridge, 
Jr., The New Textualism, 37 UCLA L. REV. 621, 660 (1990) (“Traditionally, plain meaning 
signified that under ordinary principles of grammar and dictionary definitions of its words, the 
statutory provision has only one meaning.”); Frederick Schauer, Statutory Construction and the 
Coordinating Function of Plain Meaning, 1990 SUP. CT. REV. 231, 231 (observing that members 
of the Court have “been spending their time reading (Noah) Webster, relying, both in fact and 
in articulated justification, on notions of plain meaning”); cf. Noah, supra note 9, at 292 (“In 
searching for the plain meaning of a regulation, courts sometimes deploy textualist conventions 
such as canons of construction.”). 
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As many have recognized, however, such literal approaches are 
subject to many of the same objections lodged against intentionalists 
and purposivists. Just as textualists attack multimember intent as an 
incoherent fiction, for example, so too would intentionalists and 
purposivists reject the notion of an objective, linguistic meaning of 
the regulatory text free of any contact with the interpreter.114 Instead, 
the very nature of language requires the interpreter to consider the 
text’s context.115 As a result, textualist judges must inevitably exercise 
their own discretion while purporting to rely on semantic meaning 
alone. Opportunities for judicial activism thus abound. Judges who 
desire a specific outcome, for example, can choose among various 
textual canons of construction,116 which Professor Karl Llewellyn 
famously demonstrated could be selectively used to reach 
diametrically opposed results.117 Judges also introduce selection biases 
by choosing inconsistently among different dictionaries.118 The 
empirical evidence regarding which method—intentionalism, 
purposivism, or textualism—more effectively constrains the political 
proclivities of judges is currently mixed at best.119 
Plain-meaning textualism also unduly introduces a number of 
opportunities for interpretive errors in the regulatory context. 
Specialized administrative agencies issue legislative rules to 
 
 114. Cf. Jerry L. Mashaw, Textualism, Constitutionalism, and the Interpretation of Federal 
Statutes, 32 WM. & MARY L. REV. 827, 835–36 (1991) (applying the concept to a statutory 
context); Stephen A. Plass, The Illusion and Allure of Textualism, 40 VILL. L. REV. 93, 110, 124–
25 (1995) (same); David A. Strauss, Statutes’ Domains and Judges’ Prerogatives, 77 U. CHI. L. 
REV. 1261, 1273 (2010) (same). 
 115. See Lawrence M. Solan, The New Textualists’ New Text, 38 LOY. L.A. L. REV. 2027, 
2050 (2004). 
 116. See Russell L. Weaver, Challenging Regulatory Interpretations, 23 ARIZ. ST. L.J. 109, 
154 (1991). 
 117. See Karl N. Llewellyn, Remarks on the Theory of Appellate Decisions and the Rules or 
Canons About How Statutes Are to Be Construed, 3 VAND. L. REV. 395, 401–06 (1950). But see 
Sunstein, supra note 73, at 452 (criticizing Llewellyn’s critique as overstated). 
 118. See Aprill, supra note 113, at 334. 
 119. Compare James J. Brudney & Corey Ditslear, Canons of Construction and the Elusive 
Quest for Neutral Reasoning, 58 VAND. L. REV. 1, 6–7 (2005) (examining a database of 632 
workplace-related suits from 1969 to 2003 and arguing that the outcomes of the cases in which 
Justices relied on textual canons exclusively “suggest that the canons are regularly used in an 
instrumental if not ideologically conscious manner”), with Mark Seidenfeld, A Syncopated 
Chevron: Emphasizing Reasoned Decisionmaking in Reviewing Agency Interpretations of 
Statutes, 73 TEX. L. REV. 83, 95 n.69 (1994) (examining a survey of Chevron decisions and 
finding that purposivist courts that rely on “all the traditional tools of statutory construction” 
are more likely to “take an active role in determining the meaning of a statute”). 
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implement often complex programs. Consider, for example, the Food 
and Drug Administration’s definition of a “color additive”: 
A color additive is any material . . . that is a dye, pigment, or other 
substance made by a process of synthesis or similar artifice, or 
extracted, isolated, or otherwise derived, with or without 
intermediate or final change of identity, from a vegetable, animal, 
mineral, or other source and that, when added or applied to a food, 
drug, or cosmetic or to the human body or any part thereof, is 
capable (alone or through reaction with another substance) of 
imparting a color thereto . . . . Food ingredients such as cherries, 
green or red peppers, chocolate, and orange juice which contribute 
their own natural color when mixed with other foods are not 
regarded as color additives; but where a food substance such as beet 
juice is deliberately used as a color, as in pink lemonade, it is a color 
additive . . . . An ingested drug the intended function of which is to 
impart color to the human body is a color additive. For the purposes 
of this part, the term color includes black, white, and intermediate 
grays, but substances including migrants from packaging materials 
which do not contribute any color apparent to the naked eye are not 
color additives.120 
Regulations are often filled with such technical and industry-specific 
jargon that departs from standard dictionary definitions or linguistic 
conventions. Several observers have characterized regulatory texts as 
“byzantine” and complicated in various substantive areas ranging 
from Medicaid and tax regulation to mineral rights and federal 
contracting.121 Dispiritingly, a recent federal statute requiring 
executive agencies to use “plain writing” for public documents 
explicitly excludes regulatory texts.122 Some evidence in the statutory 
context also suggests that textualist approaches are more likely to be 
subject to legislative overrides due to interpretive errors; such risks 
 
 120. 21 C.F.R. § 70.3 (2013). 
 121. See Hobbs ex rel. Hobbs v. Zenderman, 579 F.3d 1171, 1186 (10th Cir. 2009) 
(characterizing Medicaid regulation as an “extraordinarily complex set of interlocking” 
regulations); David Freeman Engstrom, Agencies as Litigation Gatekeepers, 123 YALE L.J. 616, 
712 (2013) (calling “Federal Acquisition Regulations” a “byzantine set of rules regarding 
government contracting”); Edmund L. Andrews, As Profits Soar, Companies Pay U.S. Less for 
Gas Rights, N.Y. TIMES (Jan. 23, 2006), http://query.nytimes.com/gst/fullpage.html?res=980
CE1DA133FF930A15752C0A9609C8B63&smid=pl-share [http://perma.cc/929V-2QN7] (similar 
characterization for mineral leasing regulations). 
 122. Plain Writing Act of 2010, Pub. L. No. 111-274, 124 Stat. 2861 § 2(c) (stating that a 
“covered document” under the statute “does not include a regulation”). 
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are only compounded in the regulatory context given the specialized 
language often found in legislative rules.123 
Accordingly, other textualists have increasingly embraced the 
notion that textualism need not accept the premise that meaning is an 
abstract form awaiting judicial discovery. Instead, they posit that 
judges should consult the text’s shared meanings in their appropriate 
semantic settings.124 These “new” textualists in the statutory arena 
acknowledge the importance of context and thus reject overly 
wooden, literalist interpretations.125 In this vein, Professor John 
Manning, for example, suggests a textualist approach to regulatory 
interpretation that focuses on the “meaning” of the regulatory text as 
understood in the context of its statement of basis and purpose.126 
Though his account is not yet fully developed,127 Manning notes that 
such texts can be semantically specialized, and that agencies often 
 
 123. See Matthew R. Christiansen & William N. Eskridge Jr., Congressional Overrides of 
Supreme Court Statutory Interpretation Decisions, 1967–2011, 92 TEX. L. REV. 1317, 1401–04 
(2014). 
 124. See John F. Manning, Textualism and the Equity of the Statute, 101 COLUM. L. REV. 1, 
108–09 (2001) (arguing that modern textualists “believe that statutory language, like all 
language, conveys meaning only because a linguistic community attaches common 
understandings to words and phrases, and relies on shared conventions for deciphering those 
words and phrases in particular contexts”). 
 125. See Eskridge, supra note 113, at 667 (“By focusing on the plain meaning a statute would 
have for the ordinary, reasonable reader, the new textualism has the intuitive appeal of looking 
at the most concrete evidence of legislative expectations and at the material most accessible to 
the citizenry.”); Molot, supra note 21, at 47 (noting that “[a]s a modern textualist, even Justice 
Scalia has rejected the “plain meaning” school’s refusal to consider context”); Samuel C. 
Rickless, A Synthetic Approach to Legal Adjudication, 42 SAN DIEGO L. REV. 519, 520–21 
(2005) (“For the Old Textualists, the relevant kind of meaning is the ‘plain meaning’ elucidated 
in the dictionary (word meaning). For the New Textualists, the relevant kind of meaning is what 
any reasonable and competent hearer would understand the word to mean in context (hearer 
meaning).”); see also In re Sinclair, 870 F.2d 1340, 1342 (7th Cir. 1989) (Easterbrook, J.) 
(indicating that statutory texts must be understood in light of “their contexts—linguistic, 
structural, functional, social, historical”). 
 126. See Manning, supra note 19, at 690. 
This may well distract agencies from using the statement of basis and purpose as a 
device for coherent explanation of regulatory meaning. However, it does not 
foreclose the potential use of statements of basis and purpose in their intended role as 
interpretive aids. In a Skidmore regime, if the Court looked to statements of basis and 
purpose for evidence of the linguistic and cultural environment in which a regulation 
was adopted, agencies would presumably respond by tailoring such statements to that 
application. If so, the resulting explanations of agency regulations would 
simultaneously enhance the clarity of agency decisionmaking and the accuracy of 
judicial review.  
Id. (citations omitted); id. at 688 (noting that regulatory texts “like all language, derive meaning 
from a ‘linguistic and cultural’ environment”). 
 127. Id. at 688 n.359 (“Detailed consideration of the relative legitimacy and utility of 
particular approaches to textual construction is for another day.”).  
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possess the expertise to be able to explain such texts to more 
generalist readers like a court.128 
B. Toward Public Meaning 
To evaluate these claims, it is important first to ground a theory 
of regulatory interpretation in an antecedent account of the political 
legitimacy of rulemaking.129 Without one, it would be difficult even to 
determine the relevant objects of interpretation—which texts or 
documents should be considered authoritative and why. When 
Congress grants rulemaking ability to an agency, it authorizes that 
agency to exercise a quasi-lawmaking power with the effect of a 
statute.130 With this authority, an agency can promulgate generally 
applicable rules with binding, legal consequences—on the public, 
courts, and the agency itself.131 Despite constitutional prohibitions on 
the congressional delegation of legislative power, however, courts 
have been loath to police this proscription.132 As a result, many 
administrative innovations can be understood as searches for 
 
 128. Id. at 688 (“When confronted with a technical term ‘drawn by specialists,’ an agency’s 
‘expertness comes into play’ in explaining specialized terms to a generalist court, whose strong 
suit is ordinary meaning.”). 
 129. Cf. RONALD DWORKIN, JUSTICE FOR HEDGEHOGS 133 (2011) (“[Lawyers interpreting 
statutes] must decide . . . what division of political authority among different branches of 
government and civil society is best, all things considered.”); Frank H. Easterbrook, Textualism 
and the Dead Hand, 66 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 1119, 1119–20 (arguing that notions of “political 
obligation” and “political legitimacy” must inform statutory interpretation); Jerry Mashaw, As 
If Republican Interpretation, 97 YALE L.J. 1685, 1686 (1988) (“Any theory of statutory 
interpretation . . . must . . . assume a set of legitimate institutional roles and legitimate 
institutional procedures that inform interpretation.”). 
 130. See Kenneth Culp Davis, Administrative Rules–Interpretative, Legislative, and 
Retroactive, 57 YALE L.J. 919, 919 (1948) (defining a “rule” as “the product of rule-making, and 
rule-making is the part of the administrative process that resembles a legislature’s enactment of 
a statute”). 
 131. See Ariz. Grocery Co. v. Atchinson, T. & Santa Fe Ry., 284 U.S. 370, 386 (1932) 
(“When under this mandate the Commission declares a specific rate to be the reasonable and 
lawful rate for the future, it speaks as the legislature, and its pronouncement has the force of a 
statute.”). 
 132. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 1 (“All legislative Powers herein granted shall be vested in a 
Congress of the United States, which shall consist of a Senate and House of Representatives.”); 
see Paul Diller, Habeas and (Non-) Delegation, 77 U. CHI. L. REV. 585, 588 (2010) (remarking 
on “the nondelegation doctrine’s descent into desuetude in the area of administrative law”); 
Kagan, supra note 63, at 2364 (observing that it is “commonplace” to note “that the 
nondelegation doctrine is no doctrine at all”).  
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substitute sources of accountability,133 often through procedures 
imposed by Congress and the President.134 
The most important congressional requirements are those found 
in the APA, which generally require agencies to engage in a process 
of public notice and comment before promulgating a legislative 
rule.135 Specifically, the rulemaking agency must prepare a notice for 
the Federal Register, which informs the public of “either the terms or 
substance of the proposed rule or a description of the subjects and 
issues involved.”136 In practice, most agencies provide both the full 
text of the proposed rule as well as an explanatory preamble 
including various required analyses.137 A number of cross-cutting 
statutes in addition to the APA demand that agencies provide 
information about the rule’s anticipated impacts on the environment, 
states, small businesses, and paperwork obligations.138 
Presidents have also issued executive orders that require certain 
agencies to undertake additional procedures supervised by the 
executive branch. Some governing orders, for example, call for 
executive agencies to submit to OIRA statements regarding the need 
for the regulation and its alignment with presidential priorities, as 
well as assessments demonstrating that the benefits of the 
 
 133. See Lisa Schultz Bressman, Essay, Schechter Poultry at the Millennium: A Delegation 
Doctrine for the Administrative State, 109 YALE L.J. 1399, 1402 (2000) (observing that “[s]ince 
the effective demise of the original nondelegation doctrine in 1935, the Court has searched for 
ways to assuage its abiding worry about broad delegations”). 
 134. See Amalgamated Meat Cutters v. Connally, 337 F. Supp. 737, 759 (D.D.C. 1971) 
(Leventhal, J.) (“The claim of undue delegation of legislative power broadly raises the challenge 
of undue power in the Executive and thus naturally involves consideration of the interrelated 
questions of the availability of appropriate restraints through provisions for administrative 
procedure and judicial review.”); Scott A. Keller, How Courts Can Protect State Autonomy from 
Federal Administrative Encroachment, 82 S. CAL. L. REV. 45, 59 (2008) (arguing that “given the 
underenforcement of the nondelegation doctrine, the Court should apply procedural limits in 
the administrative law context ‘as a second-best surrogate’ for the substantive enforcement of 
the nondelegation doctrine”). 
 135. 5 U.S.C. § 553(b) (2012). 
 136. Id. 
 137. See KERWIN & FURLONG, supra note 12, at 64 (stating that “[n]otices of proposed 
rulemaking nearly always contain not only the full text of the rule that the agency has developed 
to that point but a preamble as well”); id. (“Notices of proposed . . . rules often contain a great 
deal of additional information” such as the “results of the reviews they are required to conduct 
under a variety of statutes and executive orders.”). 
 138. See 2 U.S.C. § 1532 (2012) (unfunded mandates on state, local, tribal governments, or 
private sector); 5 U.S.C. § 604(b) (2012) (regulatory flexibility analyses); 42 U.S.C. § 4332(2)(C) 
(2012) (environmental impact statements); 44 U.S.C. § 3507(e) (2012) (paperwork burden 
analyses). 
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regulation “justify” the costs.139 Additional executive orders also 
demand that agencies gather data on the rule’s expected impacts on 
states,140 energy use,141 small businesses,142 and Indian tribes,143 among 
other potentially affected groups. In preparing such analyses, agencies 
must, in effect, interpret the regulation to predict its consequences: 
what is the regulation’s scope and to whom and when does it apply 
such that aggregate costs and benefits can be determined? Once the 
agency has submitted the draft notice and required analyses to 
OIRA, the office will then coordinate a process whereby it will solicit 
comments from executive-branch reviewers, and then help to resolve 
any disagreements that arise.144 
After this OIRA-coordinated review process is complete, the 
agency head must then sign the proposed regulatory text and 
preamble for publication in the Federal Register.145 Agencies then 
give interested persons an opportunity to comment on the proposed 
rule by submitting their views, supporting or opposing arguments, and 
any relevant evidence.146 After considering these comments, the 
agency can then issue a revised final rule in the Federal Register, 
which courts have determined must be a “logical outgrowth” of the 
 
 139. Exec. Order No. 12,866 § 3(b), 3 C.F.R. 638, 639 (1994). This executive order, with 
minor exceptions, covers all agencies except those “considered to be independent regulatory 
agencies,” id. § 1(b)(6), 3 C.F.R. at 641, as defined by a provision of the Paperwork Reduction 
Act, 44 U.S.C. § 3502(10) (1988). See also Exec. Order No. 13,563 §§ 1(b), 2–6, 3 C.F.R. 215, 
215–17 (2012) (“reaffirm[ing] the principles, structures, and definitions governing contemporary 
regulatory review that were established in Executive Order 12866” and modernizing many of its 
provisions). 
 140. Exec. Order No. 13,132, 3 C.F.R. 206 (2000). 
 141. Exec. Order No. 13,211, 3 C.F.R. 767 (2002).  
 142. Exec. Order No. 13,272, 3 C.F.R. 247 (2003).  
 143. Exec. Order No. 13,175, 3 C.F.R. 304 (2001).  
 144. See Sunstein, supra note 64, at 1844–59 (describing OIRA-coordinated review process). 
 145. By signing the text of the regulation, the agency head has taken responsibility for the 
rule’s authorship. See David J. Barron & Elena Kagan, Chevron’s Nondelegation Doctrine, 2001 
SUP. CT. REV. 201, 238 (“Authorship is a familiar concept in agency practice; indeed, agencies 
today are admirably (if surprisingly) punctilious about this feature of their interpretive rulings 
and other actions.”). Depending on how the agency is structured, there is sometimes a 
subagency head as well. Prominent examples of this relationship include the Patent and 
Trademark Office within the Department of Commerce, or the Food and Drug Administration 
within the Department of Health and Human Services. See Kirti Datla & Richard L. Revesz, 
Deconstructing Independent Agencies (and Executive Agencies), 98 CORNELL L. REV. 769, 784 
n.90, 817–18 (2013). 
 146. 5 U.S.C. § 553(c) (2012) (“After notice required by this section, the agency shall give 
interested persons an opportunity to participate in the rule making through submission of 
written data, views, or arguments with or without opportunity for oral presentation.”). 
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proposed rule.147 The APA further requires that the final rule be 
accompanied by a “concise and general statement” of the rule’s “basis 
and purpose.”148 In practice, however, such statements of basis and 
purpose are hardly “concise” given that agencies generally prepare 
them in anticipation of judicial, executive, and legislative review.149 
Courts, for their part, now extend a “hard look” to the agency’s 
preamble when determining whether a regulation is arbitrary or 
capricious under the APA.150 What is important to note about this 
standard of rationality is that it is framed exclusively in terms of 
technocratic factors.151 Agencies cannot justify their regulatory 
changes by reference to purely political factors, but must be able to 
explain them with respect to evidence in the rulemaking record.152 
 
 147. See, e.g., CSX Transp., Inc. v. Surface Transp. Bd., 584 F.3d 1076, 1081 (D.C. Cir. 2009) 
(“[O]ur cases finding that a rule was not a logical outgrowth have often involved situations 
where the proposed rule gave no indication that the agency was considering a different 
approach, and the final rule revealed that the agency had completely changed its position.”); 
Nw. Tissue Ctr. v. Shalala, 1 F.3d 522, 528 n.7 (7th Cir. 1993) (“To determine if a final rule is a 
logical outgrowth of the proposed one, the court must decide ‘whether the purposes of notice 
and comment have been adequately served.’”); see also Phillip M. Kannan, The Logical 
Outgrowth Doctrine in Rulemaking, 48 ADMIN. L. REV. 213 (1996) (discussing the development 
of the logical outgrowth doctrine).  
 148. 5 U.S.C. § 553(c) (2012) (“After consideration of the relevant matter presented, the 
agency shall incorporate in the rules adopted a concise general statement of their basis and 
purpose.”). 
 149. See 5 U.S.C. § 801(a)(1)(A) (2012) (requiring agencies to “submit to each House of the 
Congress and to the Comptroller General a report containing . . . a copy of the rule . . . [and] a 
concise general statement relating to the rule, including whether it is a major rule”); Curtis W. 
Copeland, The Role of the Office of Information and Regulatory Affairs in Federal Rulemaking, 
33 FORDHAM URB. L.J. 1257, 1273 (2006) (describing the “regulatory review package to OIRA” 
as “consisting of the rule, any supporting materials, and a transmittal form”). 
 150. 5 U.S.C. § 706(2)(A) (2012); see Noah, supra note 9, at 309–10, 309 n.203 (observing 
that “[a]s courts became more demanding in their substantive review of rules adopted through 
notice-and-comment procedures” and adopted a “hard look” approach, “agency prolixity 
increased” with “[p]reambles for especially controversial rules . . . [that] respond in detail to 
public comments in anticipation of defending against a judicial challenge”); Stack, supra note 9, 
at 396 (“Hard-look review imposes a higher standard of rationality as a condition of validity 
than the minimum standard applied in constitutional review of legislation.”). 
 151. See Kathryn A. Watts, Proposing a Place for Politics in Arbitrary and Capricious 
Review, 119 YALE L.J. 2, 7, 19–20 (2009). 
 152. Id. at 19–20. This is not, of course, to say that expertise can be hermetically sealed from 
politics; to the contrary, different administrations are likely to have different understandings of 
the same information and data. See Dan M. Kahan, Ellen Peters, Maggie Wittlin, Paul Slovic, 
Lisa Larrimore Ouellette, Donald Braman & Gregory Mandel, The Polarizing Impact of 
Science Literacy and Numeracy on Perceived Climate Change Risks, 2 NATURE CLIMATE 
CHANGE 732, 732 (2012); Dan M. Kahan, Ideology, Motivated Reasoning, and Cognitive 
Reflection, 8 JUDGMENT & DECISION MAKING 407, 407 (2013). But even when political changes 
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Consequently, agencies attempt to show they have “examine[d] the 
relevant data” they received through public comment and then 
“articulate a satisfactory explanation for [their] actions,” including 
“rational connection[s] between the facts found and the choice[s] 
made” in their final rules.153 In other words, agencies usually attempt 
to provide a well-reasoned explanation for their policy choices with 
reference to the evidence received through notice and comment. In 
addition to these explanations, agencies also often publish or 
summarize the various final analyses required by statute and 
executive order in the Federal Register as well.154 Publication, in turn, 
provides formal notice to the public of the rule’s existence and 
content; an agency’s failure to publish the regulation would render it 
ineffective.155 
Either before or shortly after publication, agencies then send 
their final rules to Congress as part of the report-and-wait procedures 
of the Congressional Review Act (CRA).156 The CRA demands that 
both executive and independent agencies send a copy of every new 
“major” final rule to each congressional house as well as the 
Government Accountability Office.157 The rules must be accompanied 
by their cost-benefit analyses, if any, as well as “any other relevant 
information or requirements” under statute or executive order.158 As 
such, Congress has available to it the operative regulatory text, 
statement of basis and purpose, and any regulatory analyses before 
deciding whether or not to pass a joint resolution of disapproval.159 
 
are the most likely explanation for a policy shift, administrative law only allows such shifts when 
accompanied by a reasoned explanation grounded in factual data.  
 153. Motor Vehicle Mfrs. Ass’n of the U.S. v. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co., 463 U.S. 29, 
43 (1983) (citation omitted). 
 154. See 44 U.S.C. § 1503 (1982 & Supp. II 1985); Legislation, The Federal Register Act, 49 
HARV. L. REV. 1209, 1209 (1936) (“All documents authorized to be published must be filed with 
the Division, and they are not valid until so filed and made available for public inspection.”). 
 155. See 44 U.S.C. § 1507 (1982); Noah, supra note 9, at 285–86 (describing evolving 
standards of agency publication in the Federal Register); Randy S. Springer, Note, Gatekeeping 
and the Federal Register: An Analysis of the Publication Requirement of Section 552(a)(1)(D) of 
the Administrative Procedure Act, 41 ADMIN. L. REV. 533, 544 (1989) (“Agency documents that 
fall within the provisions of the publication rule of section 552(a)(1)(D) and are not so 
published are ineffective against a party without actual notice.”). 
 156. 5 U.S.C. §§ 801–808 (2012). 
 157. Id. § 801(a)(1)(A)–(B). “Major” rules are defined as those with an annual impact on 
the economy of $100 million or more, a “major increase in costs or prices” or other “significant 
adverse” effect on the economy. Id. § 804(2).  
 158. Id. § 801(a)(1)(B). 
 159. Id. § 801(a)(1)(A)–(B). Beyond replicating bicameralism and presentment, the statute’s 
main innovation is that the CRA reduces the costs of nullifying a rule by fast-tracking joint 
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Both the Senate and the House then have sixty days in which to pass 
such a resolution,160 which if issued, would then need to be signed by 
the President to take effect, or if vetoed, passed by a two-thirds 
overriding vote.161 If Congress fails to pass a joint resolution within 
the required time frame, then the final rule goes into effect.162 
As this overview of the rulemaking process demonstrates, 
administrative agencies have multiple political principals, including 
Congress and the President.163 Agencies cannot promulgate binding, 
legislative rules without surviving the various procedural chokepoints 
that can effectively prevent a regulation from going into effect.164 
These procedures, in turn, help to legitimate the regulations 
promulgated by unelected administrators by ensuring review by more 
politically accountable actors. Moreover, the information produced as 
a result of these procedures—through notice-and-comment, OIRA-
coordinated review, as well as congressional oversight—facilitates 
political monitoring.165 At each of these junctures, interest groups can 
 
resolutions. These expediting features include the bypass of many potentially obstructive 
congressional committees as well as a prohibition on Senate filibusters and fixed time limits on 
legislative debates. Id. §802(c)–(f) (discussing the expediting process). The CRA also extends 
the time period during which a major rule cannot go into effect, from thirty to sixty days, thus 
allowing for longer legislative reconsideration. See Note, The Mysteries of the Congressional 
Review Act, 122 HARV. L. REV. 2162, 2166–67 (2009).  
 160. 5 U.S.C. § 801(a)(3). 
 161. Id. 
 162. Id. 
 163. See Evan J. Criddle, Fiduciary Foundations of Administrative Law, 54 UCLA L. Rev. 
117, 164–65 (2006) (characterizing agencies as “agents of the executive branch, Congress, or the 
people as a whole”); Elizabeth Magill, Agency Self-Regulation, 77 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 859, 872 
(2009) (describing an agency as an “agent . . . formally controlled by other principals, like 
Congress, the courts, or the President”). 
 164. See William N. Eskridge, Jr., Norms, Empiricism, and Canons in Statutory 
Interpretation, 66 U. CHI. L. REV. 671, 677 n.13 (1999) (defining “vetogate” as “a place within a 
process where a statutory proposal can be vetoed or effectively killed”). The term “veto gate” 
appears to have first appeared in the legal literature in McNollgast, Positive Canons, supra note 
13, at 707. Variations of the core idea are also sometimes referred to as “pivot points,” “veto 
players,” or the politics of “negative power”—terms which this Article will use interchangeably. 
See, e.g., id. at 707 n.5 (defining “veto players”); CAMERON, supra note 14, at 3 (defining the 
politics of “negative power” as the “consequences of an institutionalized ability to say no”); 
KREHBIEL, supra note 14, at 23–24 (drawing on dictionary definition to specify a “pivot” as “a 
person or thing on or around which something turns or depends”). 
 165. See David Epstein & Sharyn O’Halloran, Administrative Procedures, Information, and 
Agency Discretion, 38 AM. J. POL. SCI. 697, 699 (1994) (discussing ongoing oversight of 
agencies); Mathew D. McCubbins, Roger G. Noll & Barry R. Weingast, Administrative 
Procedures as Instruments of Political Control, 3 J.L. ECON. & ORG. 243, 261–62 (1987) 
(describing “tools available to political actors to control administrative outcomes through 
process, rather than through substantive guidance in legislation”). 
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actively attempt to influence the process by, for example, submitting 
comments, scheduling meetings with executive-branch actors, or 
lobbying legislators. Such “fire-alarm” oversight, however, is 
premised on the public’s understanding of what the text of the 
regulation means and how it could affect the various interests 
implicated.166 
C. Method 
Regulatory textualism thus asks the judge to ascertain the public 
meaning of the operative regulatory text in light of a hierarchy of 
select sources generated and legitimated by the regulatory procedures 
just described. Unlike competing theories, which also invoke the 
distinctive nature of the rulemaking process to justify their respective 
approaches,167 regulatory textualism emphasizes the importance of a 
text’s public meaning as ratified by political principals like the 
President and Congress, and subject to judicial review.168 
This perspective has statutory and constitutional analogues,169 
though it is specifically tailored to the procedures through which the 
 
 166. Mathew D. McCubbins & Thomas Schwartz, Congressional Oversight Overlooked: 
Police Patrols Versus Fire Alarms, 28 AM. J. POL. SCI. 165, 166 (1984). 
 167. See Noah, supra note 9, at 281 (observing that “it is far easier to ascribe an intent to an 
agency when it issues a rule than to a legislature when it enacts a statute, both because of 
differences in their decisionmaking routines and because of the greater reliability of the 
materials that document the bases for their decisions”); Stack, supra note 9, at 380 (noting that 
distinctive features of the regulatory process such as “the APA’s procedural requirement that 
the agency issue a statement of basis and purpose, the arbitrary and capricious review’s standard 
of rationality, and Chenery’s timing rule” justify regulatory purposivism); id. at 392–94 (noting 
that “the critical difference between regulations and statute[s] is how the court discerns 
purposes”); Weaver, supra note 9, at 711 (“Courts must treat regulations differently than 
statutes because agencies generate different types of interpretive materials than do legislatures. 
Instead of committee reports, explanations of committee chairmen, records of debate and the 
other materials that legislatures typically create, agencies prepare notices of proposed 
rulemakings, draft rules, regulatory analyses and other documents.”). 
 168. Cf. John F. Manning, Textualism and Legislative Intent, 91 VA. L. REV. 419, 420 (2005) 
(noting that the basic premise of textualism is “that judges must seek and abide by the public 
meaning of the enacted text, [as] understood in context”); Lawrence B. Solum, Originalism and 
the Unwritten Constitution, 2013 U. ILL. L. REV. 1935, 1956 (characterizing “public-meaning 
originalism” as both “go[ing] beyond semantic content; if the meaning of the Constitution were 
limited to its semantic content, its meaning would be very sparse—we would read the 
Constitution as if we knew nothing about the context in which it was framed and ratified” and 
seeking “the linguistic meaning as enriched by the publicly available context of constitutional 
communication”). 
 169. See, e.g., Manning, supra note 168, at 419–50; Victoria Nourse, Misunderstanding 
Congress: Statutory Interpretation, the Supermajoritarian Difficulty, and the Separation of 
Powers, 99 GEO. L.J. 1119, 1166 (2011) (developing an interpretive theory in statutory context 
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executive, legislature and the courts imbue regulations with 
legitimacy. Specifically, the approach draws upon the nature of these 
review processes to generate a hierarchy of sources based on their 
public accessibility, reliability, and relevance to the interpretive issue 
in question.170 Different forms of regulatory history can be ranked 
according to the source’s likelihood to shed credible light on the 
public meaning of a text as well as to address the interpretive 
question with appropriate specificity. 
To aid in this task, positive political theories developed in the 
statutory context invite a conception of regulations as bargains struck 
between various regulatory actors and interest groups at different 
veto-gates of the drafting process—involving the agency head, the 
President during OIRA-coordinated review, and legislators pursuant 
to the CRA.171 Veto-gates are junctures in an institutional process 
during which an authoritative actor can effectively prevent a 
regulation from proceeding further.172 The judge’s task is to privilege 
sincere rather than strategic statements from these actors as evidence 
 
that “supports a public meaning approach toward statutory interpretation, one which demands 
that courts not blind themselves to legislative history as evidence of ordinary or public 
meaning”); Michael Stokes Paulsen, Does the Constitution Prescribe Rules for Its Own 
Interpretation?, 103 NW. U. L. REV. 857, 882 (2009) (in constitutional context, equating 
“objective, original-public-meaning” with “in-context, written textualism”); Solum, supra note 
168, at 1955 (“For public-meaning originalists, the public meaning of the text is produced by the 
semantic content of the text as enriched by the publicly available context of constitutional 
interpretation.”). 
 170. Cf. ESKRIDGE ET AL., supra note 20, at 310 (positing that “legislative history should be 
used only when it is accessible, relevant, and reliable” and arguing that “there ought to be—and 
we think there is—a hierarchy of sources for that history”). Bernard Bell’s statutory-
interpretation theory also calls for the privileging of particular sources of legislative history 
based on the extent to which such materials are available to all legislators and considered 
authoritative by them, and all legislators are all able to respond. Because the rulemaking 
process directly invites the public to participate in its drafting, interpretive materials that are 
available to the wider public should similarly be considered as privileged sources in the 
regulatory context. See Bernard W. Bell, Legislative History Without Legislative Intent: The 
Public Justification Approach to Statutory Interpretation, 60 OHIO ST. L.J. 1, 83 (1999) (arguing 
that the “text of the statute must be interpreted in light of the public justification provided” by 
Congress). 
 171. See STEVEN P. CROLEY, REGULATION AND PUBLIC INTERESTS 97 (2008) (noting 
that “whereas the president lacks the ability to veto selective pieces of legislation, he enjoys a 
‘line-item veto,’ so to speak, of agencies’ regulatory initiatives”); Jack M. Beermann, 
Congressional Administration, 43 SAN DIEGO L. REV. 61, 84 (2006) (“By enacting [the 
Congressional Review Act], Congress has taken responsibility for supervising agency 
rulemaking and, in a sense, is lending its authority to those rules that it does not overrule under 
the procedure.”). 
 172. Cf. Esksridge, supra note 164, at 677 n.13 (defining “veto gate” as “a place within a 
process where a statutory proposal can be vetoed or effectively killed”).  
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of the public meaning to which they agreed. Statements are sincere if 
the speakers would suffer some cost by misrepresenting the bargain.173 
If a committee report, for instance, misstates the meaning of the bill, 
then there is a risk that the median legislator would reject the bill. 
Thus, a committee would be better off communicating its true 
preferences; as such, the committee report is often a valuable 
interpretive source in statutory interpretation.174 
Although these insights are often framed in intentionalist 
terms,175 when coupled with a publicity requirement, they can also 
help guide the search for regulatory meaning as well—by shedding 
light on how the public was most likely to comprehend the meaning 
of the text as reflected in the most reliable and accessible statements 
by authoritative regulatory actors. Because the rulemaking process, 
even more so than the statutory or constitutional contexts, depends 
on the ability of the public to directly participate, there is a close 
nexus between what the public understands and the materials that are 
furnished by regulatory actors for comment. What legitimates the 
rulemaking process is not the private preferences of pivotal 
regulatory actors, but rather their public rationales, which form the 
basis for interest-group participation. 
Applying these premises, the interpretive materials that are the 
most likely to be credible are those that are made public and subject 
to multiple forms of oversight by pivotal actors. Accordingly, 
regulatory textualism first calls for the judge to read the regulatory 
text in light of the relevant explanatory provision in the regulation’s 
statement of basis and purpose, or preamble. Preambles are 
structured documents that often address each provision of the 
regulatory text; thus, locating the appropriate section is often a 
straightforward task.176 In addition, these explanations usually 
 
 173. McNollgast, Legislative Intent, supra note 13, at 26 (“Observing costly actions can help 
judges exclude some alternative interpretations.”). 
 174. Id. at 27–28 (discussing committee report example). 
 175. See id. at 3 (seeking to “identify aspects of the legislative history that are more reliably 
informative about the intent of the majority coalition that enacted a statute” (emphasis added)). 
 176. See STACK, supra note 12, at 34, 37–38 (observing that although agency practices can 
vary, they often “organize background discussions of preambles in a section-by-section 
format”); id. at 48 (noting that “a well-organized preamble reduces the costs of locating its 
guidance”); Stack, supra note 9, at 404 (observing that “statements of basis and purpose 
generally appear in a single, highly organized document”); id. at 406 (noting that “at a practical 
level . . . statements of basis and purpose are typically much more specific than statutory 
statements of purpose”). 
NOU IN PRINTER-FINAL (DO NOT DELETE) 9/15/2015  10:56 PM 
2015] REGULATORY TEXTUALISM 119 
respond to material public comments in detailed ways,177 as, for 
example, when commenters ask how particular terms are defined and 
the agency attempts to clarify.178 
Provision-by-provision analyses in preambles are the most 
reliable sources of the text’s public meaning because they are subject 
to review by multiple veto-gate actors, including the President, 
Congress, and the courts. Consequently, it would be costly for the 
agency to attempt to strategically skew the meaning of a text away 
from what it publicly conveyed earlier, or to otherwise self-delegate 
through intentionally vague explanations.179 Not only could such 
efforts result in the rejection or revision of a regulation if the agency 
is subject to OIRA-coordinated or congressional review, but the 
preamble could also be vulnerable to judicial challenge as arbitrary or 
capricious,180 as failing to provide sufficient notice to allow for 
adequate comment,181 or as otherwise not constituting a “logical 
outgrowth” of the final rule.182 
Moreover, some have aptly observed that these materials are to a 
final rule much like what ratified legislative history is to a statute.183 
Indeed, Congress will occasionally formally adopt and approve 
selections of its drafting history directly in the enacted statutory text. 
 
 177. See STACK, supra note 12, at 37 (“Agencies also provide guidance in the course of 
responding to comments through a section-by-section analysis.”). 
 178. Id. at 36–37 (“Agencies frequently provide guidance about the meaning and application 
of their regulations in a dialogue with commenters in the preamble.”); id. at 11 (noting that 
preambles include “engagement with commentators”); Noah, supra note 9, at 311 (observing 
that “a preamble may have included reassurances in response to comments that expressed 
concerns about particular applications of a proposed rule”). 
 179. Cf. Stack, supra note 9, at 416 (considering administrative law doctrines that would 
mitigate the “prospect for strategic manipulation by agencies if courts treated statements of 
basis and purpose as privileged interpretive sources” by “making their policy resistant to 
change, issue only obscure statements in the hopes of preserving their future flexibility, or 
attempt to smuggle policies into statements of basis and purpose”). 
 180. See supra notes 150–153 and accompanying text. 
 181. See supra note 147 and accompanying text; Stack, supra note 9, at 417 (observing that 
“agencies have been tempted to smuggle important policies into their statements of basis and 
purpose that were not previously subjected to the notice-and-comment process” but that these 
temptations are mitigated by “enforcement of the procedural core of notice-and-comment 
rulemaking: that the public has an adequate opportunity to comment on the agency’s proposed 
policy”).  
 182. See Stack, supra note 9, at 418 n.308 (discussing the “logical outgrowth” doctrine). 
 183. See Noah, supra note 9, at 311–12. To illustrate, he offers the example of the Civil 
Rights Act of 1991, which states that “[n]o statements other than the interpretive memorandum 
appearing at Vol. 137 Congressional Record S 15276 (daily ed. Oct. 25, 1991) shall be 
considered legislative history . . . .” See id. (citing Pub. L. No. 102-166, § 105(b), 105 Stat. 1071, 
1075).  
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Such ratified legislative history is distinct from ordinary legislative 
history because it has been signed by the President and adopted by 
Congress as a whole, rather than one of its committees. Similarly, the 
preamble’s provision-by-provision explanations and responses to 
comments have also been officially approved and ratified by the 
agency as an institution after review by multiple authoritative actors. 
But, unlike legislative history, these materials have also undergone 
public comment and thus the scrutiny of interested parties. 
By contrast to Stack’s purposivist approach,184 regulatory 
textualism rejects reliance on the broad statements of purpose often 
found in preambles in favor of the more specific explanatory 
provisions. Such broad statements are pitched at too high a level of 
abstraction to inform the court’s specific interpretive task.185 These 
statements, as discussed, also often admit of multiple purposes or 
simply mirror the language of the statute in ways that do not shed any 
independent interpretive light.186 At best, they might be understood as 
guidance for future agency interpretations, given that agencies are 
more institutionally capable of applying purposivist approaches 
relative to courts.187 
If the specific preamble provision is silent or otherwise unable to 
yield sufficient insights to resolve the ambiguity, then the judge 
should next proceed to the regulatory analyses published or 
referenced in the Federal Register. These analyses usually apply the 
regulation to specific factual scenarios to determine the various 
consequences of the regulation. Should the agency strategically 
misstate the impacts of the rule, it could face a potential veto by the 
executive branch, Congress, or the courts. To predict these 
consequences, agency staff must, in effect, interpret the regulation 
 
 184. See Stack, supra note 9, at 395 (noting that when a statement of basis and purpose lacks 
a “specific justification,” nevertheless “the more general grounding of the regulation in 
protecting the integrity of the markets suggests a guidepost for interpretation”). 
 185. For example, the roadless rule contained the following broad statement of purpose:  
This final rule prohibits road construction, reconstruction, and timber harvest in 
inventoried roadless areas because they have the greatest likelihood of altering and 
fragmenting landscapes, resulting in immediate, long-term loss of roadless area values 
and characteristics . . . . Additionally, the size of the existing forest road system and 
attendant budget constraints prevent the agency from managing its road system to the 
safety and environmental standards to which it was built.  
Special Areas; Roadless Area Conservation, 66 Fed. Reg. 3244, 3244 (Jan. 12, 2001) (to be 
codified at 36 C.F.R. pt. 294). 
 186. See supra note 69. 
 187. See STACK, supra note 12, at 3; see also VERMEULE, supra note 18, at 209; Herz, supra 
note 23, at 92; Sunstein & Vermeule, supra note 18, at 928.  
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with some degree of specificity in order to collect the requisite data. 
For executive branch agencies, the most commonly available analysis 
is the regulatory impact analysis of significant rules required by 
executive order.188 These analyses contain the agency’s description of 
the rule’s anticipated costs and benefits, net benefits, and the 
potential alternatives considered.189 As such, the documents often 
communicate the various regulatory options considered and rejected 
by the agency. Readers of the regulatory text would thus reasonably 
understand the accompanying text as not applying to the rejected 
options.190 Judicial regulatory interpretation should, in turn, align with 
this public understanding. 
To illustrate, take a regulation from the U.S. Department of 
Agriculture (USDA) revising the definition of “retail pet store” to 
narrow the class of parties exempt from various licensing, 
recordkeeping, and maintenance requirements.191 The previous 
exemption had covered most retail outlets including those that sold 
animals over the Internet, or else through mail or telephone sales, 
sight unseen. With the rise of such sales, however, came numerous 
public complaints about the lack of oversight in the health and 
treatment of these animals, especially given the inability of consumers 
to personally observe them.192 In response, the USDA sought to 
restrict the exemption so that the rule would now cover these entities. 
So the USDA changed the text of the exemption to cover only those 
“place[s] of business” in which the “seller, buyer, and the animal 
available for sale are physically present so that every buyer may 
personally observe the animal” before sale.193 In other words, the 
 
 188. See Exec. Order No. 12,866 § 6(a)(3)(B), 3 C.F.R. 638, 645 (1994). 
 189. Id. § 3(c)–(d), 3 C.F.R. at 641. 
 190. See Noah, supra note 9, at 314–15 (“Obviously, if an agency specifically considers and 
rejects such alternatives to a regulation that it promulgates, it should not subsequently interpret 
the regulation as if it encompassed one or more of those alternatives all along.”). Indeed, 
commenters on agency action regularly do rely on such analyses when submitting their 
comments. See, e.g., Ronald E. Wyzga & Annette C. Rohr, Electric Power Research Institute 
(EPRI), Comment on EPA Proposed Rule on National Ambient Air Quality Standards for 
Particulate Matter (Apr. 18, 2006), http://www.regulations.gov/contentStreamer?documentId=
EPA-HQ-OAR-2001-0017-1538&attachmentNumber=1&disposition=attachment&content
Type=pdf [http://perma.cc/6Z55-BWKD] (commenting on rule in light of regulatory impact 
analysis). 
 191. Animal Welfare; Retail Pet Stores and Licensing Exemptions, 78 Fed. Reg. 57,227 
(Sept. 18, 2013) (to be codified at 9 C.F.R. pt. 1). 
 192. Id. at 57,227. 
 193. Id. at 57,249. The full text of the definition reads:  
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exemption now only applied to places of business where the buyer 
could actually inspect the animals. 
The regulatory impact analysis for the rule, in turn, presented the 
other options that the USDA had considered, but rejected.194 One of 
those options included the possibility of including hybrid 
operations—retailers who sold animals both in physical stores as well 
as some sight unseen—from the definition of exempt “retail pet 
stores.”195 Because hybrid operators still posed heightened risks to 
animals given that that some of the purchasers could not personally 
inspect the animals, however, the agency explicitly decided not to 
exempt such operators.196 The rule’s resulting regulatory analyses, as 
required by executive order and by the Regulatory Flexibility Act 
(RFA), then applied this definition in calculating the number of 
entities potentially affected by the rule.197 Because the public relied 
upon the regulatory impact analysis as an indication of the predicted 
regulatory consequences, regulatory textualism calls for the text to be 
read consistently with the regulatory impact analysis. Accordingly, in 
future cases, the regulatory text defining “retail pet stores” should not 
be read to include hybrid operators. 
As for their reliability and public availability, regulatory analyses 
are generally not as accessible as regulatory preambles. Relative to 
such preambles, they tend to have less standardized format and 
content.198 Although many agencies do make the full results of such 
 
Retail pet store means a place of business or residence at which the seller, buyer, and 
the animal available for sale are physically present so that every buyer may personally 
observe the animal prior to purchasing and/or taking custody of that animal after 
purchase, and where only the following animals are sold or offered for sale, at retail, 
for use as pets: Dogs, cats, rabbits, guinea pigs, hamsters, gerbils, rats, mice, gophers, 
chinchillas, domestic ferrets, domestic farm animals, birds, and coldblooded species. 
Id. 
 194. See U.S. DEP’T OF AGRIC., ANIMAL & PLANT HEALTH INSPECTION SERVICE, 
REGULATORY IMPACT ANALYSIS AND FINAL REGULATORY FLEXIBILITY ANALYSIS FOR 
FINAL RULE REVISION OF THE DEFINITION OF RETAIL PET STORE 51–55 (2013), http://
www.aphis.usda.gov/publications/animal_welfare/2013/APHIS-2011-0003-15371%20RIA.pdf 
[http://perma.cc/Q282-CH52].  
 195. Id. at 52. 
 196. Id. 
 197. Id. at 3–9 (estimating number of potentially affected entities). 
 198. See Robert W. Hahn, How Changes in the Federal Register Can Help Improve 
Regulatory Accountability, 52 ADMIN. L. REV. 927, 947 (2000) (observing that “Federal Register 
notices that present regulatory analysis currently exhibit a great deal of variation in the kind of 
information that is presented”). 
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analyses available in the Federal Register,199 agencies also vary greatly 
with regard to how much of their analyses they publish as opposed to 
summarize or incorporate by reference.200 Many agencies simply make 
their regulatory analyses available online, even if not published in the 
Federal Register.201 For these reasons, regulatory analyses are not as 
consistently accessible as statements of basis and purpose in the 
Federal Register and thus should reside lower in the interpretive 
hierarchy. 
At the same time, regardless of their form, agencies are required 
by executive order to “[m]ake available to the public the 
information” contained in the regulatory impact analyses submitted 
to OIRA.202 Many statutes like the RFA also require agencies to 
“make copies of the . . . analysis available to members of the public” 
and, at a minimum, to include a simple “summary” in the Register.203 
As a result, such analyses still remain valid interpretive sources as 
they are usually publicly accessible in some way, and like statements 
of basis and purpose, are also subject to review by multiple politically 
authoritative actors. Regulatory impact analyses required by 
executive order, for example, are considered by multiple entities 
within the executive branch, and then submitted to Congress for 
 
 199. See KERWIN & FURLONG, supra note 12, at 75–86 (observing that agencies “report in 
preambles the results of the reviews they are required to conduct under a variety of statutes and 
executive orders”); Matthew D. Adler, Welfare Polls: A Synthesis, 81 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1875, 1903 
(2006) (observing that “the EPA, having relied on a [contingent valuation] survey in conducting 
its cost-benefit analysis of a rule, may then publish this analysis in the Federal Register”). 
 200. See GOV’T ACCOUNTABILITY OFFICE, REGULATORY REFORM: AGENCIES COULD 
IMPROVE DEVELOPMENT, DOCUMENTATION, AND CLARITY OF REGULATORY ECONOMIC 
ANALYSIS 17, GAO-RCED-98-142 (1998) [hereinafter GAO, REGULATORY REFORM], 
http://www.gao.gov/archive/1998/rc98142.pdf [http://perma.cc/58AH-ZL9B] (“Some of the 
analyses [in the studied sample] contained executive summaries, while others relied on the 
preambles to the proposed and final rules, published in the Federal Register, to summarize their 
results.”); Hahn, supra note 198, at 939 (concluding, based on study of economically significant 
rules from 1996 through February 10, 1998, that it is “quite likely that the Federal Register 
notices are not taking advantage of important information contained in RIAs”). 
 201. See Robert W. Hahn and Mary Beth Muething, The Grand Experiment in Regulatory 
Reporting, 55 ADMIN. L. REV. 607, 626 (2003) (discussing the Office of Management and 
Budget’s efforts to increase the amount of regulatory analyses made available online).  
 202. Exec. Order No. 12,866, § 6(a)(3)(E)(i), 3 C.F.R. 638, 645 (1993).  
 203. 5 U.S.C. § 604(b) (2012) (“The agency shall make copies of the final regulatory 
flexibility analysis available to members of the public and shall publish in the Federal Register 
such analysis or a summary thereof.”). 
NOU IN PRINTER-FINAL (DO NOT DELETE) 9/15/2015  10:56 PM 
124 DUKE LAW JOURNAL [Vol. 65:81 
review as well.204 The same is true of studies prepared under statutes 
such as the RFA and Paperwork Reduction Act.205 
As Noah points out, the statement of basis and purpose and the 
regulatory analyses are thus analogous to the advisory committee 
notes for the Federal Rules of Procedure as well as the application 
notes published alongside the Federal Sentencing Guidelines206—both 
interpretive sources to which courts give “great weight”207 or treat as 
“authoritative,” respectively.208 Like these materials, regulatory 
analyses are often published contemporaneously with the final rules 
and guidelines after a report-and-wait procedure with Congress.209 
They are also adopted by the agency before they are sent to 
Congress. Consequently, these materials are less susceptible to the 
worry that an unelected civil servant could usurp the agency’s quasi-
legislative function.210 Given that regulatory analyses must be 
approved by an agency head after multiple review processes, it is 
more difficult for unaccountable staff members to sneak in sources 
without authoritative oversight.211 
 
 204. See supra notes 139–144 & 163–168 and accompanying text; Sunstein, supra note 64, at 
1842 (noting that “[e]specially for economically significant rules, the analysis of costs and 
benefits receives careful attention” during OIRA-coordinated review, though “most of OIRA’s 
day-to-day work is usually” not “spent . . . on costs and benefits”). 
 205. See id. at 1870–71 (“OIRA spends a great deal of time helping to promote compliance 
with various statutory requirements, including those associated with the Regulatory Flexibility 
Act . . . and the Paperwork Reduction Act”). 
 206. See Noah, supra note 9, at 316 (noting that “at least since Congress began reviewing 
new agency rules in 1996, preambles and regulatory analyses may have a better pedigree by 
virtue of that report-and-wait system and, therefore, deserve closer attention from the courts 
than they have received in the past, more akin to the respect given to the advisory committee 
notes that accompany the federal rules of procedure”). 
 207. See Torres v. Oakland Scavenger Co., 487 U.S. 312, 316 (1988); Miss. Publ’g Corp. v. 
Murphree, 326 U.S. 438, 444 (1946); United States v. Navarro, 169 F.3d 228, 237 (5th Cir. 1999); 
United States v. Anderson, 942 F.2d 606, 611 (9th Cir. 1991). 
 208. See Melendez v. United States, 518 U.S. 120, 127–30 (1996); Williams v. United States, 
503 U.S. 193, 201 (1992) (observing that Sentencing Commission policy statements that 
interpret guidelines are “authoritative”); United States v. Hill, 645 F.3d 900, 907–08 (7th Cir. 
2011); Catherine T. Struve, The Paradox of Delegation: Interpreting the Federal Rules of Civil 
Procedure, 150 U. PA. L. REV. 1099, 1113 (2002). 
 209. See Noah, supra note 9, at 316 (“Like the federal rules of procedure, sentencing 
guidelines do not take effect until after surviving a report-and-wait process.”). 
 210. See Manning, supra note 19, at 732. 
 211. See Noah, supra note 9, at 323 (noting that regulatory history generally “pose[s] less of 
a risk of manipulation or circumvention of procedures for legislating than do legislative 
histories”); Stack, supra note 9, at 416–18 (analyzing various “incentives for strategic 
manipulation” by agency actors). 
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Another useful parallel here is that between regulatory analyses 
and cost estimates provided by the Congressional Budget Office 
(CBO) with respect to legislation. By statute, the CBO provides 
Congress with estimated budgetary impacts of bills approved by 
certain congressional committees.212 Because Congress often “drafts in 
the shadow” of these CBO budget scores, Professors Abbe Gluck and 
Lisa Bressman have proposed an “interpretive presumption” that 
statutory ambiguities be construed consistently with these scores 
given their “centrality” to the drafting process.213 Whatever the 
strength of their argument in the context of statutory interpretation, 
the case for consulting relevant analogues in regulatory interpretation 
is even stronger. Although the CBO produces cost estimates for 
almost every bill approved by a full congressional committee, such 
estimates are not formally subject to public notice and comment.214 By 
contrast, the regulatory analyses that accompany a proposed rule are 
generally vetted and supplemented by interest groups and other 
rulemaking participants, thus rendering the public understanding of 
such analyses that much more integral to the regulatory drafting 
process. In addition, such analyses form the basis for what can 
amount to a veto by the President and Congress before the regulation 
can be promulgated; such analyses can also be subject to judicial 
arbitrary-and-capricious review in a way that CBO budget scores are 
not.215 
 
 212. Section 402 of the Congressional Budget and Impoundment Control Act of 1974 directs 
the CBO to estimate the budgetary effects of bills and resolutions approved by various 
congressional committees. Congressional Budget and Improvement Control Act of 1974, Pub. 
L. No. 93-344, §§ 201–203, 88 Stat. 297, 302–05 (2012) (codified as amended at 2 U.S.C. §§ 601–
603 (2012)). 
 213. See Lisa Schultz Bressman & Abbe R. Gluck, Statutory Interpretation from the Inside-
an Empirical Study of Congressional Drafting, Delegation, and the Canons: Part II, 66 STAN. L. 
REV. 725, 763–65 (2014); Abbe Gluck, The “CBO Canon” and the Debate Over Tax Credits on 
Federally Operated Health Insurance Exchanges, BALKINIZATION (July 10, 2012, 8:55 PM), 
http://balkin.blogspot.com/2012/07/cbo-canon-and-debate-over-tax-credits.html [http://perma.cc/
6FD5-LPBA]. 
 214. See Processes: What Methodology Does CBO Use in its Analyses?, CONGRESSIONAL 
BUDGET OFFICE, http://www.cbo.gov/about/our-processes [http://perma.cc/7A8L-7BBE] 
(describing informational sources for cost estimates, which include “the government’s statistical 
agencies . . . data and information from numerous outside experts” as well as informal and 
formal consultations). 
 215. See Thomas O. McGarity, Regulatory Analysis and Regulatory Reform, 65 TEX. L. REV. 
1243, 1323 (1987) (“Because substantive judicial review focuses upon whether the agency 
exercised reasoned decision making, given the evidence in the rule-making record, a well-
crafted regulatory analysis in the rule-making record may persuade a reviewing court that the 
agency did reach its decision rationally.”). 
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In short, regulatory textualism calls for the judge to discern the 
semantic meaning of the regulatory text by reference to, first, the 
preamble’s provision-by-provision analysis, and then the regulatory 
analyses. Both of these sources are sufficiently accessible and reliable 
to serve as valid bases of textual interpretation. As later discussed, if 
none of these materials in the preamble resolve the ambiguity, then 
the court should defer to an agency’s interpretation as long as it 
provides a sufficiently reasoned explanation. 
Structuring the interpretive inquiry accordingly will likely appeal 
to textualists who generally prefer a more rule-like interpretive 
approach to minimize judicial discretion,216 one that favors formalism 
over functionalism.217 Many state courts, for example, employ a tiered 
methodology for statutory interpretation that Professor Gluck refers 
to as “modified textualism,” which privileges the text first and 
foremost; if the statutory text alone cannot resolve the ambiguity, 
then the judge is allowed to consider the legislative history, followed 
by judicial presumptions such as substantive canons.218 Gluck 
hypothesizes that this structured, textualist approach helps to serve as 
a coordinating device between litigants and various courts in addition 
to fostering potential methodological consensus between avowed 
textualists and nontextualists.219 
Similarly, explicit hierarchical approaches like regulatory 
textualism can also have a restraining effect that helps to promote 
traditional rule-of-law values such as judicial fidelity.220 Because 
judges can only consult a limited number of interpretive materials 
 
 216. See Nelson, supra note 21, at 351 (arguing that the “rules and standards . . . distinction 
is a surer guide to the systematic differences between textualist and intentionalism than more 
highfalutin talk about the fundamental goals of interpretation or the distinction between 
‘objective’ meaning and ‘subjective’ intent”).  
 217. See VERMEULE, supra note 18, at 72 (describing one version of formalism in which 
“courts make a second-order decision to decide cases, where possible, according to rules rather 
than standards, sticking close to the apparent or surface meeting of legal texts and placing great 
emphasis upon the value of legal certainty and the value of adhering to common understandings 
of constitutional and statutory commands”); Daniel A. Farber, Do Theories of Statutory 
Interpretation Matter? A Case Study, 94 Nw. U. L. REV. 1409, 1411–16 (distinguishing 
“textualism” or “formalism” from “dynamic interpretation” or “pragmatism”); Gluck, supra 
note 22, at 1834 (characterizing as at the “heart” of textualism a “predictable, formalized 
approach that can clarify the interpretive process”). 
 218. See Gluck, supra note 22, at 1758, 1829 (“[T]he drive to interpretive consensus in each 
of the states studied centers around a ‘modified textualist’ approach that state courts expressly 
derive from Justice Scalia’s textualism, but which is not identical to it.”). 
 219. Id. at 1856–57. 
 220. Id. at 1820–21. 
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with the same relative priority, it is more difficult for them to scour 
the regulatory history in search of sympathetic sources.221 For a 
textualist, the ideal type of regulatory history is “an objective, 
unmanufactured history of a [regulation’s] context” that sheds light 
on whether a regulation, say, “codifies an established term of art.”222 
The regulatory preamble and analyses are sources that come closest 
to fulfilling this ideal. 
D. Applications 
To illustrate regulatory textualism in practice, this Section now 
considers more concrete examples applying the method. 
1. The Forest Service Roadless Rule.  The Forest Service, a 
subagency within the USDA, passed a legislative rule prohibiting the 
building of any new “road” in inventoried areas of designated 
national forests.223 The Forest Service interpreted the rule to permit a 
company to build a thirty-year right-of-way for motorized vehicles 
involved in the construction of a pipeline. Specifically, the permit 
allowed for a ten-mile, fifty-foot right-of-way alongside the proposed 
pipeline intended for a “variety of motor vehicles” such as “pickup 
trucks, bulldozers, backhoes, and other heavy machinery.”224 The 
right-of-way would result in the necessary destruction of trees to 
allow for these vehicles to bring equipment and supplies to build the 
pipeline and, once built, to then allow such vehicles to use the right-
of-way on a case-by-case basis for emergency repairs to the pipeline.225 
In the agency’s view, the right-of-way did not constitute a prohibited 
“road” under the regulation. 
Environmental groups, however, challenged the issuance of the 
permit as a violation of the legislative rule. In their view, a “road” 
constituted any area over which a motor vehicle could traverse from 
point to point. Thus, the Forest Service violated its own rule by 
 
 221. See Conroy v. Aniskoff, 507 U.S. 511, 519 (1993) (Scalia, J., concurring) (invoking 
Judge Harold Leventhal’s metaphor describing “the use of legislative history as the equivalent 
of entering a crowded cocktail party and looking over the heads of the guests for one’s 
friends”). 
 222. John Manning, Textualism as a Nondelegation Doctrine, 97 COLUM. L. REV. 673, 731 
(1997). 
 223. This example is drawn largely from Wilderness Workshop v. U.S. Bureau of Land 
Management, 531 F.3d 1220 (10th Cir. 2008), with some simplifications. 
 224.  Appellants’ Supplemental Brief at 11, Wilderness Workshop, 531 F.3d 1220 (No. 08-
1165) (citing the record). 
 225. Wilderness Workshop, 531 F.3d at 1222–26.  
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permitting the building of a right-of-way to facilitate motor-vehicle 
movement for pipeline development.  
Regulatory textualism would first focus the judge’s attention on 
the operative text of the regulation which provides the following 
definition of a “road”: 
Road. A motor vehicle travelway over 50 inches wide, unless 
designated and managed as a trail. A road may be classified, 
unclassified, or temporary.226 
A prohibited “temporary” road, in turn, is defined as a “road 
authorized by contract, permit, lease, other written authorization, or 
emergency operation, not intended to be part of the forest 
transportation system and not necessary for long-term resource 
management.”227 Thus, in this case, the fact that the Forest Service’s 
permit was temporary, lasting only for thirty years, would not resolve 
the interpretive ambiguity. 
The next immediate semantic question that arises would be 
whether the fifty-foot pipeline right-of-way is a “travelway” or else an 
excluded “trail.” Neither term is explicitly defined in the operative 
regulatory text.228 So the textualist judge would then move on to the 
provision-by-provision explanation in the regulatory preamble. 
There, the judge would see that in the subsection discussing the 
definition of a “road,” the agency directly acknowledged 
commenters’ concerns that the definition could be ambiguous. In 
response, the Forest Service noted that “[f]or agency consistency, this 
final rule includes the same definitions of ‘road,’ . . . and ‘temporary 
road’ that are contained in the National Forest System Road 
Management regulations.”229 In other words, the definition of “road” 
in the roadless rule was clarified to match the Forest Service’s already 
existing road-management regulations. 
From this observation, it would be reasonable for the judge to 
then attempt to read the definition in pari materia with the existing 
regulations, that is, consistently and with reference to the agency’s 
 
 226. Special Areas; Roadless Area Conservation, 66 Fed. Reg. 3244, 3272 (Jan. 12, 2001) (to 
be codified at 36 C.F.R. pt. 294). 
 227. Id.  
 228. Id. at 3267.  
 229. Id. at 3251; see also Administration of the Forest Development Transportation System; 
Prohibitions; Use of Motor Vehicles Off Forest Service Roads, 66 Fed. Reg. 3206, 3217 (Jan. 12, 
2001) (to be codified at 36 C.F.R. pt. 212). 
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other regulations.230 If the Forest Service had interpreted its previous 
regulatory definition of a road, for example, not to apply to rights-of-
way for construction-related motor vehicles, then, perhaps the court 
could interpret the definition accordingly. Unfortunately, however, 
the opinions in the case are unclear as to how the Forest Service had 
interpreted its other regulations in the past, leaving the matter still 
unresolved. 
Pressing on with the agency’s explanation of how “road” was 
defined, the judge would then see that the agency had further 
clarified the definition of a “trail” in the regulatory preamble: “A trail 
is established for travel by foot, stock, or trail vehicle, and can be 
over, or under, 50 inches wide.”231 According to the record, the permit 
was not granted for a right-of-way that would be created by foot or 
stock, such as by horse or cattle.232 Would the right-of-way be 
established by a “trail vehicle”? Although the meaning of “trail 
vehicle” is not self-evident, the record in the case suggested that the 
right-of-way would be cleared by a bulldozer, which is unlikely to fall 
into the ordinary definition of a “trail vehicle.”233 From this language, 
the judge would likely be able to conclude that the right-of-way for 
construction vehicles did not fall into the “trail” exception. 
To the extent that “trail” and “travelway” nevertheless remain 
ambiguous, the judge should then look at the regulatory analyses that 
were prepared for the rule to see what light they could shed on the 
meaning of “travelway” in particular.234 In the regulatory impact 
analysis, for example, the judge would see that an explicit cost of the 
rule was identified as “special-use authorizations (such as 
communications sites, electric transmission lines, pipelines).”235 The 
costs associated with this consequence were then qualitatively 
 
 230. Statutes can be read in pari materia, by reference to related statutes, when the statutes 
“pertain to the same subject matter—when they relate to the same person or thing, to the same 
class of persons of things, or have the same purpose or object.” 2B NORMAN J. SINGER, 
SUTHERLAND STATUTORY CONSTRUCTION § 51:3 (7th ed. 2007). 
 231. Special Areas; Roadless Area Conservation, 66 Fed. Reg. at 3272. 
 232. See Appellants’ Supplemental Brief at 11, Wilderness Workshop v. U.S. Bureau of 
Land Mgmt., 531 F.3d 1220 (10th Cir. 2008) (No. 08-1165) (citing the record’s indication that the 
right-of-way would be “cleared” and “graded to provide for safe and efficient operation of 
construction equipment and inspection vehicles”). 
 233. Id. at 2 (citing the record indicating the right-of-way would be “bulldoz[ed]”). 
 234. Indeed, the roadless rule was anticipated to have an annual impact of more than one 
hundred million dollars and was thus deemed economically significant and submitted to OIRA. 
Special Areas; Roadless Area Conservation, 66 Fed. Reg. at 3267. 
 235. Id. at 3269 (emphasis added). 
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estimated: “Current use and occupancies not affected, future 
developments requiring roads excluded in inventoried roadless areas 
unless one of the exceptions applies.”236 As none of the exceptions 
applied, the analysis accordingly contemplated that the final rule 
would impose costs on the future development of pipelines.237 Other 
stated costs of the rule included various activities that would be 
limited because “roads are often needed for these activities.”238 These 
activities included gas development and “energy-related transmission 
uses (such as ditches and pipelines . . . ).”239 
The environmental impact assessment identified similar 
consequences of the rule: 
  An additional optional exception was considered in detail . . . as a 
social and economic mitigation measure and was available for 
selection with any alternative. This exception would have allowed 
road construction or reconstruction where a road is needed for 
prospective mineral leasing activities in inventoried roadless 
areas . . . .  
  The Department has decided not to adopt the exception for 
future discretionary mineral leasing . . . because of the potentially 
significant environmental impacts that road construction could cause 
to inventoried roadless areas. Existing leases are not subject to the 
prohibitions.240 
In other words, the final environmental impact assessment specifically 
considered the rule’s prohibitive effects on new mineral leases. 
Regulatory textualism would prohibit the judge from interpreting 
“road” to allow a right-of-way specifically for oil- and gas-pipeline 
construction vehicles. In particular, the interpretation is difficult to 
reconcile with the rejected regulatory alternatives that the agency had 
considered, including options to exempt the kinds of rights-of-way 
 
 236. Id. 
 237. The rule’s only explicitly carved-out exceptions included situations that posed an 
imminent threat to public health and safety; those when it would be necessary to engage in 
environmental cleanup activities such as the cleanup of toxic chemicals from an abandoned 
mine; those in which a preexisting right was reserved by statute, treaty, or other legal 
entitlement; and those when it would be necessary to correct irreparable resource damage. Id. at 
3255. Finally, the rule allowed for road construction to implement a road-safety-improvement 
project if necessary to respect existing mineral leases and it also allowed for “infrequent” timber 
harvesting of small-diameter trees. Id. at 3258. 
 238. Id. at 3268. 
 239. Id. (emphasis added). 
 240. Id. at 3256. 
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that would likely be necessary for new pipeline and other mineral-
related developments. Thus, the reasonable reader would likely have 
understood “road” to prohibit the kind of pipeline-related rights-of-
way contemplated in the case. 
Now contrast the regulatory textualist method with how the 
Tenth Circuit actually approached the question. The court first 
looked at dictionaries and concluded that the term “travelway” was 
ambiguous.241 While citing the resulting need for deference to the 
current agency’s interpretation,242 the panel then took pains to 
determine whether that interpretation was “consistent” with the 
regulation.243 Instead of first considering other aspects of the codified 
regulatory text or the agency’s direct explanation for the term, 
however, the court instead looked to whether the agency’s 
interpretation aligned with “two provisions of the roadless rule’s 
preamble”—select excerpts of the court’s choosing.244 The first 
provision explicitly distinguished between wilderness areas and 
protected inventoried areas, and stated that the latter could be used 
for a “multitude of activities including motorized uses, grazing, and 
oil and gas development.”245 The second excerpt indicated that the 
rule was adopted in part due to “budget constraints” that made it 
impossible for the Forest Service to manage “the existing forest road 
system . . . to the safety and environmental standards to which it was 
built.”246 Both of these statements appeared in the agency’s abstract 
and untethered discussions of the rule’s purpose.247 
From these materials, the majority concluded that the preamble 
“clearly” favored the Forest Service’s interpretation because it indeed 
 
 241. Wilderness Workshop v. U.S. Bureau of Land Mgmt., 531 F.3d 1220, 1226–27 (10th Cir. 
2008) (“The key term in this definition, ‘travelway,’ is not defined in the Roadless Rule, nor 
does it appear to have any commonly accepted meaning, since it is not found in any 
contemporary dictionaries that we are aware of.”). 
 242. Id. at 1227 (citing Auer v. Robbins, 519 U.S. 452, 463 (1997); Thomas Jefferson Univ. v. 
Shalala, 512 U.S. 504, 512 (1994)). 
 243. Id. 
 244. Id. 
 245. Id. (quoting Special Areas; Roadless Area Conservation, 66 Fed. Reg. at 3249). 
 246. Id. (quoting Special Areas; Roadless Area Conservation, 66 Fed. Reg. at 3244).  
 247. Specifically, the first declaration appeared in the agency’s provision-by-provision 
explanation of the codified purpose of the rule, in response to commenters who questioned 
whether the rule allowed for multiple uses of the inventoried roadless areas. Special Areas; 
Roadless Area Conservation, 66 Fed. Reg. at 3249. The second appeared in the preamble’s 
broad discussion of the “[p]urpose and [n]eed” of the regulation. Id. at 3244.  
NOU IN PRINTER-FINAL (DO NOT DELETE) 9/15/2015  10:56 PM 
132 DUKE LAW JOURNAL [Vol. 65:81 
aligned with the “purpose” of the rule.248 Specifically, the rights-of-
way were simply “construction zones” and “nothing in the record” 
suggested they would be “considered part of the forest road 
system.”249 Moreover, the court also surmised that authorizing such 
construction zones would not burden the Forest Service’s road-
maintenance budget.250 In other words, the judges reasoned that 
because the purpose of the rule was to entertain uses like oil and gas 
development, the pipeline right-of-way aligned with one of the Forest 
Service’s goals. At the same time, the right-of-way could simply be 
characterized as a construction area rather than a “road” to facilitate 
motor-vehicle movement. As a result, the panel concluded that 
“travelway” need not be interpreted to include the right-of-way at 
issue—leading to the Forest Service’s victory.251 
The court’s approach illustrates just some of the potential 
problems with intentionalist and purposivist methods of 
interpretation. By picking and choosing selectively from the 
preamble’s broad statements of purpose instead of prioritizing only 
the specific, explanatory provision and the regulatory analyses, the 
panel was able to reach a policy conclusion contradicted by more 
specific and salient sources. Even at the level of broad generalities, 
the panel failed to acknowledge other language stating that the rule 
“prohibits road construction . . . in inventoried roadless areas because 
they have the greatest likelihood of altering and fragmenting 
landscapes.”252 In other words, the rule specified multiple policy goals 
of the regulation, such as environmental protection in addition to oil 
and gas development. Moreover, the judges engaged in analyses for 
which they were institutionally incompetent, including speculation 
about the determinants of the agency’s budget. 
Furthermore, even while invoking the rule’s purpose, the 
majority failed to prioritize or even mention the agency’s codified 
statement of purpose in the regulatory text, relying instead on the 
preamble’s broad and uncodified statements of purpose.253 That text 
was much clearer that the rule was written to balance multiple policy 
goals and not only oil and gas development. Specifically, the codified 
 
 248. Wilderness Workshop, 531 F.3d at 1227 n.5. 
 249. Id. at 1227. 
 250. Id. 
 251. Id. at 1227–28. 
 252. Special Areas; Roadless Area Conservation, 66 Fed. Reg. at 3244. 
 253. Wilderness Workshop, 531 F.3d at 1227. 
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regulatory text declared that “[t]he purpose of this subpart is to 
provide, within the context of multiple-use management, lasting 
protection for inventoried roadless areas within the National Forest 
System.”254 In fact, the Forest Service explicitly explained in its 
provision-by-provision analysis that it had revised that text to clarify 
that environmental protection had to be balanced against other 
potential uses for the inventoried roadless areas.255 Had the court 
focused on the codified regulatory text first, it would have had to 
engage in a more focused inquiry to demonstrate the consistency of 
the agency’s interpretation with the text of the rule itself. 
2. The FCC Minority-Control Broadcasting Rule.  Now consider 
another example, this time from an independent agency with a 
multimember commission not subject to OIRA-coordinated 
presidential review: the FCC.256 In 1985, the FCC issued a final rule 
that limited commercial television broadcasters to twelve licenses 
with an explicit exception permitting two additional licenses for 
“minority-controlled” stations.257 The regulatory text stated that 
“‘minority-controlled’ means more than 50 percent owned by one or 
more members of a minority group.”258 About fourteen years after the 
initial regulation was issued, the FCC interpreted this regulatory text 
as requiring an applicant to show a numerical majority–minority 
interest as well as to demonstrate the actual control of such 
 
 254. Special Areas; Roadless Area Conservation, 66 Fed. Reg. at 3272. 
 255. Indeed, in response to public comments, the Forest Service decided to change the final 
codified purpose to “emphasize that the goal of providing lasting protection of roadless areas 
must occur within the context of multiple-use management.” Id. at 3250. 
 256. See Rachel E. Barkow, Insulating Agencies: Avoiding Capture Through Institutional 
Design, 89 TEX. L. REV. 15, 18 (2010) (“Removal protection for agency heads is the touchstone 
[for identifying independent agencies], but independent agencies are also typically characterized 
by their multimember structure and the fact that, unlike executive agencies, they do not have to 
submit cost-benefit analyses of proposed rules for review by the President’s Office of 
Information and Regulatory Affairs.”); Datla & Revesz, supra note 145, at 772 (observing that 
although “[i]ndependent agencies are almost always defined as agencies with a for-cause 
removal provision,” there are actually multiple “indicia of independence: removal protection, 
specified tenure, multi-member structure, partisan balance requirements, litigation authority, 
budget and congressional communication authority, and adjudication authority”). The 
Paperwork Reduction Act also includes the Federal Communications Commission among its 
statutory definition of “independent regulatory agencies.” 44 U.S.C. § 3502(5) (2000). 
 257. Multiple Ownership of AM, FM and Television Broadcast Stations, 50 Fed. Reg. 4666 
(Feb. 1, 1985) (to be codified at 47 C.F.R. pt. 73). 
 258. 47 C.F.R. § 73.3555(d)(3)(iii) (1990). 
NOU IN PRINTER-FINAL (DO NOT DELETE) 9/15/2015  10:56 PM 
134 DUKE LAW JOURNAL [Vol. 65:81 
minorities.259 Pursuant to this interpretation, the Commission denied 
an application to renew a commercial television-broadcast license as a 
sanction for the applicant’s earlier claim to a minority preference.260 
That earlier claim was based only on a numerical majority-minority 
board without a showing of de facto minority control (for example, in 
terms of the day-to-day management operations).261 The applicant 
filed suit, arguing that the FCC’s interpretation was invalid because 
the text defined “minority control” only as “more than 50 percent 
owned by one or more members of a minority group.”262 
Regulatory textualism privileges the agency’s operative 
regulatory text. Here, the text clearly stated that the regulation’s 
definition of “minority-control” was a numerical one. The provision-
by-provision justification in the preamble confirmed this 
interpretation. There, the reader would have seen the agency’s 
further explanation: 
A question arises as to the proper definition of a minority owned 
station for the purposes of our multiple ownership rules. In this 
regard, we note that the Commission has adopted different 
standards of minority control depending on the mechanism used to 
foster its minority policies. In the context of the multiple ownership 
policies, we believe that a greater than 50 percent minority 
ownership interest is an appropriate and meaningful standard for 
permitting increases to the rules adopted herein.263 
In this manner, the enacting FCC explicitly sought to clarify any 
ambiguity in the regulatory text introduced by the agency’s previous 
“different standards of minority control”—which had sometimes 
recognized an actual-control test264—in favor of a bright-line 
numerical rule. Put differently, the final rule made clear that the 
FCC’s previous policies had sometimes defined minority control as 
 
 259. See Trinity Broad. of Fla., Inc. v. FCC, 211 F.3d 618, 625 (D.C. Cir. 2000) (“For these 
reasons, we agree . . . that majority-minority boards of directors of non-profit entities must 
exercise de facto control.”). 
 260. See id. at 624.  
 261. Id.  
 262. Id. at 625 (quoting 47 C.F.R. § 73.3555(d)(3)(iii)).  
 263. In re Amendment of Section 73.3555 [formerly Sections 73.35, 73.240 and 73.636] of the 
Comm’ns Rules Relating to Multiple Ownership of AM, FM and Television Broad. Stations, 
100 F.C.C.2d 74, 95 (1985) [hereinafter Amendment of Section 73.3555] (citation omitted). 
 264. For example, the rule cited an FCC policy document to illustrate its previous “different 
standards of minority control.” That document provided that preferential treatment for a tax 
certificate would be granted “where minority ownership is in excess of 50% or controlling.” 
Trinity Broad. of Fla., 211 F.3d at 626 (emphasis added) (quoting 47 C.F.R. § 73.3555(d)(3)(iii)). 
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part of a functional test regarding evidence of actual control, and it 
explicitly rejected that definition in the rule’s preamble.265 For these 
reasons, a court employing regulatory textualism would have rejected 
the FCC’s interpretation in the case. 
Despite the regulatory text, the D.C. Circuit took a decidedly 
purposivist approach and found that the FCC’s interpretation was not 
“inconsistent” with the underlying purpose of the regulation.266 In the 
majority’s view, it was “hard to imagine . . . how an entity controlled 
by minorities in name only or in which the minorities’ interests are 
totally passive could foster the objective of the Commission’s policies 
to broaden minority voices and spheres of influence over the 
airwaves.”267 In other words, the panel found that the broadcasting 
rule’s policy goal was to increase minority influence in commercial 
broadcasting. Accordingly, in the court’s view, only a de facto control 
test could properly further the FCC’s objective and was therefore an 
appropriate interpretation of the regulation. Whether true as an 
empirical matter or not, the court’s conclusion was a policy judgment 
rendered without access to the relevant data or expertise. 
Oddly, the D.C. Circuit then determined that the FCC’s 
interpretation nevertheless failed to provide fair notice to the 
applicants precisely because the relevant text and other agency 
statements failed to inform the public that a control test would be 
applied. The panel therefore vacated the denial of the agency’s 
license application.268 In other words, it concluded that the regulation 
could be interpreted to require minority control, but that such an 
interpretation violated basic due process. Indeed, these concerns go 
to the heart of the problems with intentionalist and purposivist 
approaches. In effect, then, the D.C. Circuit interpreted the definition 
of “minority-control” to require de facto control, but then applied 
 
 265. This textual interpretation is further bolstered by a dissent to the rule filed by a 
commissioner. Although not dispositive, that dissent interpreted the regulation as not requiring 
de facto minority control:  
Under the majority’s scheme, the right to purchase broadcast stations over the 
established ceiling turns upon the race of the proposed owners alone. No further 
showing is required with respect to how these new owners may contribute to 
diversity. No concern is given as to whether the 51% minority owners will exert any 
influence on the station’s programming or will have any control at all.  
Amendment of Section 73.3555, 100 F.C.C.2d at 104 (Comm’r Patrick, dissenting in part).  
 266. Trinity Broad. of Fla., 211 F.3d at 625 (“The question [in this case], then, is this: Does 
the Commission’s interpretation ‘sensibly conform’ to both the purpose and the text of the 
regulation?”). 
 267. Id. (emphasis added). 
 268. Id. at 619. 
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this flawed interpretation prospectively. In doing so, however, the 
court allowed the creation of a new legal obligation without the 
requisite notice and comment. By permitting the FCC’s interpretation 
to stand, the court essentially facilitated an amendment to the rule 
without the required rulemaking process. 
E. Alternatives and Objections 
Despite regulatory textualism’s concern with semantic meaning, 
its constraint on interpretive sources, and relatively rule-like 
approach, one might nevertheless remain unconvinced that the 
approach is sufficiently textualist. Isn’t it really a form of weak 
intentionalism or purposivism? Ultimately, the charge boils down to 
one of definition. Nevertheless, if one wants to recharacterize 
regulatory textualism as something else, the substance of the theory 
remains. Thus, it will now be fruitful to put the labels temporarily 
aside to more sharply highlight the differences with competing 
approaches. 
The theory that would be the most useful to compare would be 
Professor Kevin Stack’s approach, as it shares some superficial 
similarities; namely, they both restrict the judge’s interpretive 
sources, albeit in different ways and for different reasons.269 Stack’s 
purposivist method, recall, asks the interpreter to consult the rule’s 
statement of basis and purpose as if it were part of the enacted 
regulatory text. In doing so, Stack argues, the judge should attempt to 
understand the enacting agency’s objectives when promulgating the 
regulation and to interpret the regulation consistently with those 
objectives.270 Stack’s regulatory purposivism, however, largely 
conceives of rulemaking procedures focused on the requirements of 
the APA as well as federal common law requirements such as hard 
 
 269. By contrast, Noah’s intentionalist approach relies on a hierarchy of regulatory history 
that takes into account materials produced as a result of presidential and legislative oversight, 
but does not offer any explicit ranking criteria; as a result, he allows for the consideration of 
some materials such as agency-official depositions, which are generally unreliable. See Noah, 
supra note 9, at 314 (observing as possible sources of interpretation the materials resulting from 
the fact that “Congress has added a series of analytical demands that agencies consider the 
possible consequences of their actions on such things as the environment, small businesses, and 
paperwork burdens; in addition, executive orders over the years have called on agencies to pay 
special attention to possible impacts on inflation, business, and federalism”); see also id. at 320 
(“Regulated parties may attempt to depose agency officials who were responsible for drafting 
the regulation or else seek discovery of documents reflecting internal deliberations.”).  
 270. See Stack, supra note 9, at 398. 
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look review and Chenery’s271 demand that the agency rely on its 
original rationale.272 Because he views these elements as central to the 
rulemaking process, Stack argues that the regulatory text and APA-
required statement of basis and purpose are the most relevant sources 
of interpretation. Though Stack does acknowledge the role of 
presidential review in helping to rationalize regulations,273 the public 
materials prepared by agencies as part of this legitimating process are 
not valid sources in his approach. 
By comparison, regulatory textualism draws much of its 
normative force from the political authority of regulations and the 
veto-gate procedures that elected officials have imposed to monitor 
them. The interpretive method accordingly takes structural cues from 
the rulemaking process beyond judicial review to shed light on what 
the public would have understood as the meaning of the regulations 
accepted by Congress and the President. Put differently, the approach 
searches for the meaning of the regulatory text as informed by the 
publicly available materials that elected actors have furnished as the 
bases for their ratification of the regulation. 
As such, regulatory textualism seeks to build upon Stack’s and 
other scholars’ insights regarding the utility of the regulatory 
preamble as an interpretive source, but attempts to do so with some 
distinct premises regarding the nature of the rulemaking process. 
Instead of focusing on the judicial elaboration of the APA, regulatory 
textualism emphasizes the role of the President and Congress in 
negotiating regulatory texts within the permissible range of discretion 
left open by arbitrary-and-capricious review. As a result, the 
approach identifies other interpretive sources such as the regulatory 
analyses required by executive order and statute as appropriate 
evidence of the text’s public meaning. 
In addition, regulatory textualism also resists Stack’s invitation to 
treat the statement of basis and purpose as analogous to an enacted 
statutory statement of purpose and thus a coequal part of the 
 
 271. SEC v. Chenery Corp., 318 U.S. 80 (1943). 
 272. Id. at 87–88; Stack, supra note 9, at 380; see also Gillian E. Metzger, Embracing 
Administrative Common Law, 80 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 1293, 1298 (2012) (giving as an example 
of administrative common law “the reasoned decisionmaking requirement” required by hard 
look review); Ernest A. Young, The Constitution Outside the Constitution, 117 YALE L.J. 408, 
473 n.34 (2007) (characterizing Chenery as “requiring, as a matter of administrative common 
law, that an agency action can only be upheld by a reviewing court on the same grounds that the 
record discloses the agency’s action was originally based”). 
 273. Stack, supra note 9, at 397. 
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regulatory text itself. For regulatory textualists, the codified 
regulatory text is the only relevant object of interpretation.274 The 
regulatory text alone is published in the Code of Federal Regulations, 
an important legal touchstone for determining whether an agency has 
issued a substantive, legislative rule.275 Moreover, as discussed, Stack’s 
conception fails to take into account codified statements of purpose 
that agencies regularly include in the text itself. 
Nevertheless, many purposivists and intentionalists would likely 
respond that they too believe in the primacy of the text, and that any 
conflict between the text and extratextual sources should be resolved 
in favor of the former.276 Although textualists and nontextualists are 
indeed likely to agree in the easy cases—when there are clear 
conflicts between the text and external sources—many litigated 
situations will involve alleged ambiguities that could be resolved in 
different ways. These hard cases, such as those involving the Forest 
 
 274. One self-professed regulatory textualist is Justice Scalia, who confines his method to 
the meaning of the codified regulatory text as well as textual canons of construction. In 
interpreting the regulation at issue in Decker, for example, he sought to “us[e] the familiar tools 
of textual interpretation to decide: Is what the petitioners did here proscribed by the fairest 
reading of the regulations?” Decker v. Nw. Envtl. Def. Ctr., 133 S. Ct. 1326, 1342 (2013) (Scalia, 
J., dissenting). In parsing the meaning of the EPA regulation at issue, Justice Scalia applied the 
textual canon known as the rule of the last antecedent, whereby the “limiting clause or 
phrase . . . should ordinarily be read as modifying only the noun or phrase that it immediately 
follows.” Id. at 1343 (citing Barnhart v. Thomas, 540 U.S. 20, 26 (2003)). In addition, Justice 
Scalia also considered the ambiguous regulatory provision at issue alongside other provisions in 
the codified regulatory text to determine the text’s best reading. Id. at 1344. 
 275. See, e.g., Am. Min. Cong. v. Mine Safety & Health Admin., 995 F.2d 1106, 1112 (D.C. 
Cir. 1993) (considering publication of a rule in the Code of Federal Regulations as a factor for 
giving the regulation legal effect); Brock v. Cathedral Bluffs Shale Oil Co., 796 F.2d 533, 539 
(D.C. Cir. 1986) (observing that “the real dividing point between regulations and general 
statements of policy is publication in the Code of Federal Regulations, which . . . statut[ory] 
[law] authorizes to contain only documents ‘having general applicability and legal effect,’ and 
which the governing regulations provide shall contain only ‘each Federal regulation of general 
applicability and current or future effect’”); see also Preamble, THE REGULATORY GRP., 
http://www.regulationwriters.com/regulatory_glossary?id=41 [http://perma.cc/ER23-5MKT] (“A 
preamble is not a part of the regulatory text, and therefore does not appear in the Code of 
Federal Regulations. A preamble is not legally enforceable . . . .”). 
 276. See, e.g., Newman, supra note 27, at 542–44 (“The essential rule, perhaps, is not to 
violate plain words.”); Noah, supra note 9, at 290 (arguing that, before granting deference, 
courts should “pay[] closer attention to the text of an existing rule”); Stack, supra note 9, at 391–
92 (arguing for an interpretive method that would “track those of a purposive approach to 
statutes: the court’s aim is to discern the purpose of the regulation and its provisions, and to 
interpret the regulation to carry out those purposes to the extent permitted by its text while 
remaining consistent with policies and principles of clear statement”); Weaver, supra note 9, at 
698–99 (“Courts do not, and should not, relentlessly attempt to effectuate the purpose of an 
enactment. Rather, they must be sensitive to its words.”). 
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Service’s roadless rule or the FCC’s minority-control regulation, are 
the ones that will expose the consequences of various interpretive 
commitments. What is really at stake between textualism and its 
alternatives is how judges identify and resolve ambiguities, what 
questions they ask when attempting to do so, and with what 
objectives in mind. 
In addition to these contested dimensions, intentionalists and 
purposivists are likely to raise a number of other objections to 
regulatory textualism as well. One of the strongest may be to the use 
of regulatory analyses as interpretive sources because the 
consideration of such analyses would raise judicial decision costs. 
Because such analyses can be lengthy, asking judges to pore over 
these studies would stretch judicial resources too thinly. Note, 
however, that many agencies often reference the same regulatory 
analyses to fulfill multiple statutory and presidential mandates.  
Consider, for example, the Unfunded Mandates Reform Act 
(UMRA), which requires agencies to provide economic assessments 
of government mandates affecting state governments, local 
governments, and the private sector.277 According to one former 
OIRA Administrator, “[a]gencies generally meet UMRA 
requirements with reference to regulatory impact analyses prepared 
pursuant to [e]xecutive [o]rder . . . but rarely do more.”278 In other 
words, agencies often prepare regulatory analyses to submit to 
OIRA, and then refer to the same analyses to fulfill multiple 
analytical requirements imposed by statute or executive order. As 
another example, the Securities and Exchange Commission often 
prepares cost-benefit analyses that simply cross-reference their 
statutorily required estimates of paperwork burdens.279 Consequently, 
the number of independent analyses that actually accompany a final 
rulemaking in the Federal Register is usually fairly limited. 
 
 277. Unfunded Mandates Reform Act of 1995, Pub. L. No. 104-4, 109 Stat. 48 (codified in 
scattered sections of 2 U.S.C.). 
 278. See Susan E. Dudley, Prospects for Regulatory Reform in 2011, 12 ENGAGE: J. 
FEDERALIST SOC’Y PRAC. GROUPS 7–8 (2011); see also GAO, REGULATORY REFORM, supra 
note 200, at 17 n.8 (“Because agencies rarely prepare separate analyses when UMRA is 
applicable . . . our findings reflect the extent to which the nine analyses called for under UMRA 
satisfy the act’s as well as the executive order’s requirements for economic analyses.”). 
 279. See Bruce Kraus & Connor Raso, Rational Boundaries for SEC Cost-Benefit Analysis, 
30 YALE J. ON REG. 289, 297 (2013) (“SEC CBA did not quantify expected benefits, and its 
quantified costs were typically limited to a subset of the direct compliance burden, estimated for 
an entirely different purpose: a mandate under the Paperwork Reduction Act (PRA).”). 
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Another possible objection might arise from an attempt to 
analogize the regulatory impact analysis required by executive order 
to presidential signing statements in the statutory context. 
Presidential signing statements are essentially documents that 
Presidents sometimes issue upon the signing of a bill. They vary in 
substance but, as relevant here, can describe a bill, explain its 
purpose, or advance a particular interpretation of the statute.280 One 
objection to these statements is that they threaten to undermine 
bicameralism and presentment.281 The concern is that judicial 
acknowledgement of them allows the President to legislate while 
subverting constitutional strictures either by insulating his views from 
a supermajority veto or else by allowing him a line-item veto.282  
Extending this critique to the regulatory context, one might 
argue that asking a judge to interpret a regulation in light of the 
materials generated by the OIRA-coordinated presidential review 
process would essentially allow the President to exert more influence 
than allowed by statute. Those who are skeptical of the legitimacy of 
the President’s rulemaking role in the first place might reject 
regulatory textualism for granting the President’s understanding of 
the regulation undue weight. The distinctive institutional dynamics of 
regulatory drafting, however, dispel such concerns. All of the 
published materials arising from the presidential review process are 
approved by the agency head before publication283—unlike 
presidential signing statements which are not considered by Congress 
before the bill is signed.284 As a result, regulatory analyses are better 
understood as the product of a back-and-forth between the President 
and the agency head, rather than a unilateral statement of the 
 
 280. See Curtis A. Bradley & Eric A. Posner, Presidential Signing Statements and Executive 
Power, 23 CONST. COMMENT. 307, 308 (2006). 
 281. See William D. Popkin, Judicial Use of Presidential Legislative History: A Critique, 66 
IND. L.J. 699, 700 (1991) (addressing the concern that judicial use of legislative history is 
improper because legislative history is not formal law and can be easily manipulated by 
competing political factions). There is a sizeable literature on statements in which the President 
expresses his constitutional concerns about a signed bill—raising different issues that are not 
directly implicated here. See, e.g., Gary Lawson & Christopher D. Moore, The Executive Power 
of Constitutional Interpretation, 81 IOWA L. REV. 1267, 1279–80 (1996); Marc N. Garber & Kurt 
A. Wimmer, Presidential Signing Statements as Interpretations of Legislative Intent: An Executive 
Aggrandizement of Power, 24 HARV. J. ON LEGIS. 363, 366–68 (1987).  
 282. See U.S. CONST. art. I, § 7; Clinton v. City of New York, 524 U.S. 417 (1998). 
 283. See supra note 211 and accompanying text. 
 284. Bradley & Posner, supra note 280, at 338. 
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President alone.285 In addition, all of the relevant materials are also 
sent to back to the agency head for his signature after OIRA has 
completed its review, and then to Congress during its wait-and-see 
periods under the CRA.286 As such, any incentives for the President to 
strategically misstate his understanding of the rule would be 
mitigated.287 For these reasons, any concerns that could arise from an 
analogy to presidential signing statements fade in the rulemaking 
arena.288 
Similar dynamics also help to mitigate another set of concerns 
that might arise, this time from the potential dynamic effects of 
regulatory textualism. Perhaps most obvious is a worry about 
regulatory ossification. Because the approach allows judges to 
 
 285. See Sunstein, supra note 64, at 1848 (noting that “there are countless instances in which 
the process of interagency comment during OIRA review, or the agency’s own continuing 
consideration of the underlying issues, leads the agency to make changes quickly and with 
enthusiasm”). 
 286. See supra notes 156–162 and accompanying text. 
 287. Cf. McNollgast, Legislative Intent, supra note 13, at 28 (“Presidential signing 
statements, for example, cannot be rejected or overturned by Congress, and are not negotiated 
with members of the legislative coalition. Hence, the potential for unchecked opportunistic 
behavior by the president is great.”). 
 288. Furthermore, as a constitutional matter, the President also has a legitimate role to play 
in exercising regulatory oversight consistently with underlying authorizing statutes. Such 
oversight authority is exemplified by the President’s power to appoint officers not otherwise 
provided for by heads of departments or the court, to coordinate agency actions, and to 
emphasize his political priorities. Despite much academic debate about the significance of a 
specific delegation to an agency head instead of the President, most agree that some degree of 
oversight by agency heads is constitutional. See Sunstein, supra note 64, at 1874 n.126 (noting 
that “[t]here is a great deal of academic discussion about whether the president may ‘overrule’ 
those within the executive branch, including Cabinet heads, who may be delegated a degree of 
statutory discretion” but arguing that “[t]he issue has more theoretical interest than practical 
importance” since “those who work for the President want to act consistently with his goals, 
priorities, and views”). Moreover, in practice, the line between presidential direction and 
oversight is often unclear. Strauss, supra note 64, at 704 (“The difference between oversight and 
decision can be subtle, particularly when the important transactions occur behind closed doors 
and among political compatriots who value loyalty and understand that the president who 
selected them is their democratically chosen leader.”). The President’s primary recourse against 
a recalcitrant agency head remains removal, but presidents shape agency rulemaking in myriad 
ways, whether though ex parte informal communications, strong norms of loyalty, or budgetary 
carrots and sticks. See Sierra Club v. Costle, 657 F.2d 298, 404–05 (D.C. Cir. 1981) (stating that 
informal meetings between the President and members of executive-branch agencies are 
generally permitted during the rulemaking process). Furthermore, parties seeking judicial 
review of an agency action are usually unable to prove that the President or his staff overrode 
an agency head’s decision. As a result, constitutional challenges to the President’s rulemaking 
involvement are often unlikely to succeed. See Robert V. Percival, Who’s in Charge? Does the 
President Have Directive Authority Over Agency Regulatory Decisions?, 79 FORDHAM L. REV. 
2487, 2535 (2011) (calling such scenarios “extremely rare”). 
NOU IN PRINTER-FINAL (DO NOT DELETE) 9/15/2015  10:56 PM 
142 DUKE LAW JOURNAL [Vol. 65:81 
consider the regulatory analyses and preambles, rulemaking could 
become even costlier than it currently is since regulatory drafters will 
now have to spend more time than they already do bargaining over 
the relevant language.289 Relatedly, regulatory textualism could also 
result in agencies becoming less willing to publicize their reasoning in 
order to preserve their flexibility.290 One could also be concerned that 
an increasing judicial focus on the regulatory preamble would 
politicize the analyses as regulatory actors attempt to skew them in a 
way that would be favorable to an interpretation they later desire.291 
Although the magnitude of these dynamic effects is an empirical 
question, there are some reasons to think that the marginal incentives 
created by regulatory textualism will be minimal since many of these 
incentives already exist under current review procedures. For 
example, the OIRA-coordinated review process already requires 
multiple internal and external agency actors to comb through 
multiple drafts of the preamble and negotiate its language. Moreover, 
as others have noted, the ability of agencies to withhold information 
relevant to the rulemaking is also constrained due to hard-look 
judicial review’s requirement that the agency disclose all the relevant 
data and evidence relied upon by the agency.292 Finally, the risks of 
politicization under current review procedures are already well 
known, and many have called for innovations such as peer review to 
mitigate such risks.293 Consequently, the strategic dynamic effects of 
calling upon judges to interpret regulations by reference to the 
regulatory analyses and preamble are likely to be limited. 
III.  DEFERENCE 
Given that regulatory textualism supplies a method for courts to 
determine whether an agency’s construction is “plainly erroneous” or 
 
 289. See Thomas O. McGarity, Some Thoughts on “Deossifying” the Rulemaking Process, 
41 DUKE L.J. 1385, 1419 (1992).  
 290. See Stack, supra note 9, at 417 (noting the risk that interpretive approaches that rely on 
the statement of basis and purpose could “encourage an agency to be less explicit in its 
statement of basis and purpose in order to preserve its future flexibility”). 
 291. See id. 
 292. See id. (observing that the incentive for agencies to issue vague statements of basis and 
purpose are “checked” by the fact that “[t]he agency’s rule . . . will . . . have to survive hard-look 
review and the demand for agency reason-giving”). 
 293. See Final Information Quality Bulletin for Peer Review, 70 Fed. Reg. 2664, 2674 (Jan. 
14, 2005); Fred Anderson et al., Regulatory Improvement Legislation: Risk Assessment, Cost-
Benefit Analysis, and Judicial Review, 11 DUKE ENVTL. L. & POL’Y F. 89, 92 (2000); Sidney A. 
Shapiro, OMB and the Politicization of Risk Assessment, 37 ENVTL. L. 1083 (2007). 
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“inconsistent” under Seminole Rock’s first step, the next issue is how, 
and to what extent, a court should give an interpretation “controlling 
weight” when the text is otherwise ambiguous.294 This Part argues that 
deference is due to the agency’s interpretation as long as the agency 
provides a sufficiently reasoned explanation for the interpretation. 
A. Why Deference? 
When the regulatory text is ambiguous, Seminole Rock deference 
subordinates judicial interpretation to agency interpretation in that it 
privileges the agency’s construction over that of the court—even 
though the court may have read the regulation differently on its own. 
Some have referred to this concept as “binding” deference, 
emphasizing the primacy of the agency’s resolution of any regulatory 
ambiguity.295 The opinion in Seminole Rock itself did little to justify 
such deference, though a number of rationales have since been 
invoked by later courts,296 and further elucidated by scholars.297 One 
possible basis for judicial deference, for example, is that Congress’s 
delegation of rulemaking authority to an agency necessarily includes 
the authority to interpret those regulations.298 In other words, when 
Congress grants an agency rulemaking power, it also grants the 
agency the authority to interpret the resulting regulations. Judicial 
deference follows from this presumed legislative choice.299 
 
 294. Bowles v. Seminole Rock & Sand Co., 325 U.S. 410, 414 (1945). 
 295. See Manning, supra note 19, at 617, 621–23. 
 296. See id. at 629 (“Perhaps because of the perceived common sense appeal of Seminole 
Rock deference, it took many years for the Court to offer any detailed rationale for the 
doctrine.”); Stephenson & Pogoriler, supra note 88, at 1454 (noting that Seminole Rock “offered 
no explanation whatsoever—nor even a citation to any other authority” for its principle).  
 297. See, e.g., Manning, supra note 19, at 629–31 (surveying rationales for Seminole Rock 
deference); Stephenson & Pogoriler, supra note 88, at 1444–45 (same). 
 298. See, e.g., Pauley v. BethEnergy Mines, Inc., 501 U.S. 680, 681 (1991) (“From this 
congressional delegation [to promulgate regulations] derives the Secretary’s entitlement to 
judicial deference [to the interpretation of those regulations].”); Martin v. Occupational Safety 
& Health Review Comm’n, 499 U.S. 144, 151 (1990) (“Because applying an agency’s regulation 
to complex or changing circumstances calls upon the agency’s unique expertise and 
policymaking prerogatives, we presume that the power authoritatively to interpret its own 
regulations is a component of the agency’s delegated lawmaking powers.”). 
 299. See Stephenson & Pogoriler, supra note 88, at 1444–45 (noting that courts’ pragmatic 
rationales for Seminole Rock generally deploy—either implicitly or explicitly—a legal fiction 
about congressional intent: “the presumption that when Congress delegated the agency the 
authority to make rules with the force of law, it implicitly delegated to the agency the authority 
to clarify those rules with subsequent (reasonable) interpretations that should themselves be 
treated by courts as authoritative”). 
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On the one hand, this argument seemingly parallels the basis for 
Chevron deference to an agency’s statutory as opposed to regulatory 
interpretation.300 That doctrine requires judicial deference to an 
agency’s reasonable construction of a statute that the agency itself 
administers when the statute is ambiguous.301 Courts presume that 
the ambiguity reflects a legislative desire to delegate that 
interpretive authority to the rulemaking agency, and not the courts.302 
On the other hand, as Manning and others have pointed out, there 
are important differences between statutory and regulatory 
interpretation that render this reasoning suspect for Seminole Rock 
deference.303 Namely, when a regulation is ambiguous, that ambiguity 
is not created by Congress, but rather by the rule-drafting agency. In 
essence, by promulgating an ambiguous regulation, agencies are “self-
delegating” the power to engage in future lawmaking through 
enforcement actions, adjudication, or nonlegislative rules.304 By 
contrast, when Congress drafts legislation, it cannot reserve the 
power to control its enforcement.305 Nor can Congress attempt to 
change or veto the interpretation of its own statute unless it passes 
another statute to modify the previous statutory text.306 Thus, it is 
unclear how Congress can delegate a power that it does not itself 
possess. 
 
 300. See Stack, supra note 9, at 371–92 (drawing a parallel between Chevron and Seminole 
Rock). 
 301. Manning, supra note 19, at 627 (“Seminole Rock adopts an approach to agency 
interpretations of regulations that, in important respects, is quite similar to Chevron’s 
framework for statutes.”); Chevron, U.S.A., Inc. v. Nat. Res. Def. Council, Inc., 467 U.S. 837, 
842 (1984). Its two-part test is a familiar one: in Step One, the judge must ask “whether 
Congress has directly spoken to the precise question at issue.” If Congress’s intent is “clear,” 
then that intention governs. If, however, the statute is ambiguous or silent, then in Step Two, 
courts ask whether the agency’s interpretation is “permissible” and, if so, defer accordingly. Id. 
at 842–43; Stephen Breyer, Judicial Review of Questions of Law and Policy, 38 ADMIN. L. REV. 
363, 370 (1986); Antonin Scalia, Judicial Deference to Administrative Interpretations of Law, 
1989 DUKE L.J. 511, 517; Cass R. Sunstein, Law and Administration After Chevron, 90 COLUM. 
L. REV. 2071, 2086 (1990). 
 302. See United States v. Mead Corp., 533 U.S. 218, 241 (2001) (“When, Chevron said, 
Congress leaves an ambiguity in a statute that is to be administered by an executive agency, it is 
presumed that Congress meant to give the agency discretion, within the limits of reasonable 
interpretation, as to how the ambiguity is to be resolved.”). 
 303. See Manning, supra note 19, at 619–30. 
 304. Stephenson & Pogoriler, supra note 88, at 1471. 
 305. See Bowsher v. Synar, 478 U.S. 714, 734 (1986) (“By placing the responsibility for 
execution of the [Act] in the hands of an officer who is subject to removal only itself, Congress 
in effect has retained control over the execution of the Act and had intruded into the executive 
function.”). 
 306. See Immigration & Naturalization Serv. v. Chadha, 462 U.S. 919, 958 (1983). 
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Beyond the delegation argument for deference is yet another 
rationale that has been invoked by various courts, which 
acknowledges the agency’s unique status as the regulatory drafter. 
Because agency actors themselves were involved in the writing of the 
rule, this argument goes, the agency is better situated relative to a 
court to interpret its meaning. Matthew Stephenson and Miri 
Pogoriler refer to this as the “originalist rationale” for Seminole Rock 
deference.307 As they have also pointed out, however, the rationale’s 
plausibility decreases the more years have gone by since the initial 
rulemaking. The more time that passes, the more likely the original 
political appointees and career staff involved are to have departed the 
agency.308 The remaining career staff may now also face different 
political overseers such that they are unlikely to sincerely reveal the 
original meaning of or impetus for the enacted regulation. 
Alternatively, one might acknowledge that the originalist and 
delegation rationales are simply legal fictions and instead justify 
deference to an agency’s interpretation of its own regulation on more 
baldly pragmatic grounds. This is likely the strongest basis for agency 
deference, if any, as well as the most prevalent.309 In this view, the best 
foundation for Seminole Rock deference arises from the recognition 
that agencies are engaging in interstitial policy making when 
interpreting an ambiguous regulation. Thus, judicial deference is 
appropriate given the comparative institutional assessment that 
agencies are superior policy makers compared to courts.310 As in 
Chevron, such arguments are grounded in familiar arguments about 
the agency’s superior political accountability and expertise relative to 
a court.311 Although agency heads are not elected, they are 
presidentially appointed, Senate confirmed, and subject to continuing 
oversight. Agencies also possess technical expertise as well as 
 
 307. See Stephenson & Pogoriler, supra note 88, at 1454.  
 308. Id. at 1472–73. 
 309. Id. at 1457 (“As between these two justifications for Seminole Rock deference, the 
pragmatic justification is ascendant, while the originalist rationale has been in decline.”). 
 310. Pauley v. BethEnergy Mines, Inc., 501 U.S. 680, 697 (1991); see also Thomas Jefferson 
Univ. v. Shalala, 512 U.S. 504, 512–13 (1994). 
 311. See Manning, supra note 19, at 617–18 (explaining that “the Court justifies Seminole 
Rock deference on the basis of an agency’s superior political accountability [and] policymaking 
competence”); Jonathan T. Molot, The Judicial Perspective in the Administrative State: 
Reconciling Modern Doctrines of Deference with the Judiciary’s Structural Role, 53 STAN. L. 
REV. 1, 100–01 (2000) (“Just as it did in justifying deference to agency interpretations of statutes 
in Chevron, the Supreme Court has relied upon agency accountability and agency expertise to 
justify judicial deference to agency interpretations of regulations.”). 
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knowledge about how complicated regulatory schemes interact and fit 
together.312 Thus, when a legislative rule is ambiguous, judges should 
defer to the agency’s construction rather than impose their own. 
Perhaps in a nod to Seminole Rock’s shifting moorings, a number 
of Supreme Court members—most vocally Justices Scalia, Roberts, 
and Alito—have expressed doubt about the viability of the doctrine 
as recently as last Term.313 A few years before that, in Christopher v. 
SmithKline Beecham Corp.,314 a majority (including the same three 
Justices as well as Justices Kennedy and Thomas) refused to grant 
deference to the Department of Labor’s interpretation of its own 
regulation.315 They did so on the grounds that the agency had 
announced its new interpretation for the first time in amicus briefs 
and in a manner that was inconsistent with its previous 
interpretations.316 Instead of applying Seminole Rock deference, the 
Court instead applied a more independent approach drawn from 
Skidmore v. Swift.317 Under Skidmore, courts generally analyze 
 
 312. Though the often-inextricable relationship between politics and expertise in regulatory 
policy helps to ground the dual underpinnings of deference, in cases where the two factors 
seemingly pull in different directions, note that arbitrary-or-capricious review continues to 
require agencies to justify their policy decisions in terms of expertise. See Motor Vehicle Mfrs. 
Ass’n of the U.S. v. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co., 463 U.S. 29, 43 (1983); supra notes 151–153 
and accompanying text. In other words, when a change in political leadership results in a 
regulatory interpretation that cannot be justified with reference to the available information, 
then such agency decisions are less likely to be upheld despite any political official’s desire to 
take responsibility. As such, agencies always remain subject to the requirement to give reasons 
for new regulatory policies by reference to the best available data and information in the record, 
with variations in scrutiny depending on the nature of the agency action. Merely invoking the 
fact of new political leadership is currently insufficient on its own as a valid reason for 
regulatory change. Instead, such a change must be publicly explained and justified with respect 
to the available evidence. See Watts, supra note 151, at 18–20 (describing how arbitrary-or-
capricious review focuses only on apolitical explanations grounded in expertise). 
 313. See, e.g., Perez v. Mortg. Bankers Ass’n, 135 S. Ct. 1199, 1213 (2015) (Scalia, J., 
concurring) (advocating that Auer deference be “abandon[ed]”); id. at 1225 (Thomas, J., 
concurring) (arguing that “the entire line of precedent beginning with Seminole Rock raises 
serious constitutional questions and should be reconsidered”). Justice Roberts and Justice Alito 
also wrote separately in a case, for example, to state that “[t]he bar is now aware that there is 
some interest in reconsidering [the Seminole Rock] cases, and has available to it a concise 
statement of the arguments on one side of the issue.” Decker v. Nw. Envtl. Def. Ctr., 133 S. Ct. 
1326, 1338 (2013) (Roberts, C.J., concurring). Justice Scalia, for his part, continued to reiterate 
his case for Seminole Rock deference’s overdue demise. Id. at 1339 (Scalia, J., concurring in part 
and dissenting in part).  
 314. Christopher v. SmithKline Beecham Corp., 132 S. Ct. 2156 (2012). 
 315. Id. at 2169. 
 316. Id. 
 317. See id. at 2168–69; see also Skidmore v. Swift & Co., 323 U.S. 134, 140 (1944) (setting 
out this standard). 
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whether they find an agency’s interpretation to be persuasive. More 
specifically, they look at a number of factors such as the 
“thoroughness” of the agency’s consideration; the reasoning’s 
“validity” and “consistency”; and, more generally, any factors which 
give an interpretation the “power to persuade, if lacking power to 
control.”318 By applying Skidmore instead of Seminole Rock, without 
overruling or otherwise distinguishing the latter, the Court appeared 
to be engaging in a threshold analysis of when Seminole Rock would 
even apply. 
A critical defining feature of the Skidmore deference regime is 
that the court remains the authoritative interpreter that must be 
swayed by the agency for the agency to win deference.319 In the 
statutory-interpretation context, courts usually invoke such deference 
when the agency has not been granted lawmaking authority, or when 
the agency does not exercise such authority through formalized 
procedures like formal adjudication or notice-and-comment 
rulemaking.320 When the agency does not use such procedures to issue 
its statutory interpretation, the reasoning goes, courts should be more 
skeptical of the result and thus must be independently persuaded that 
the interpretation is correct. A related rationale for the Skidmore 
regime is that the court is a superior interpreter in situations when the 
agency has not used deliberative procedures that provide fair notice 
and invite public input.321 
Extending this logic to regulatory interpretation, one could argue 
that Seminole Rock deference should similarly be restricted to 
particular forms of agency action that use certain procedures such as 
 
 318. Id. John Manning has defended the Skidmore approach to regulatory deference on a 
number of grounds. Most importantly, he argues that Skidmore supplies a critical “independent 
interpretive check” on agency regulatory interpretation by contrast to Seminole Rock’s relative 
capitulation. See Manning, supra note 19, at 687. Because an agency would no longer be able to 
determine definitively the meaning of its own ambiguous rule, it would have greater incentive to 
regulate more clearly in the text, thus providing clearer notice to regulated entities. Id. In 
addition, because Skidmore depends on the persuasiveness of the agency’s explanation, it would 
also spur agencies to provide more carefully considered justifications for the rule in their 
statements of basis and purpose. Id. at 689. Finally, the approach duly recognizes that agencies 
may have semantic insights into the specialized meaning of regulatory terms of art. Id. at 688. 
 319. See Thomas W. Merrill & Kristin E. Hickman, Chevron’s Domain, 89 GEO. L.J. 833, 
856 (2001) (“Skidmore . . . makes clear that the weight given to the agency interpretation is 
always ultimately up to the court.”).  
 320. United States v. Mead Corp., 533 U.S. 218, 230 (2001). 
 321. Id. 
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formal adjudication.322 One limitation of this approach, however, is 
that the bulk of agency interpretive actions do not occur through such 
procedures, but rather through more informal means, leaving most 
agency interpretations to Skidmore deference as a practical matter.323 
Taken on its own terms, however, Skidmore does not fully appreciate 
the pragmatic justifications for deference to an agency’s regulatory 
interpretation when the text is otherwise ambiguous. As previously 
discussed, an agency is more likely than a court to possess the 
requisite expertise, experience, and accountability with which to 
resolve better the textual ambiguity.324 In terms of institutional 
capacity, agencies are also better situated to engage in interstitial 
policy making that does not otherwise conflict with the regulatory 
text; internally, they will have access to rulemaking materials such as 
staff memoranda, public comments, and reports that courts will not.325 
Furthermore, Skidmore’s multifactor test also threatens interpretative 
unpredictability and instability in providing notice to regulated 
entities. 
B. Regulatory Hard Look 
For these reasons, regulatory textualism calls for an intermediate 
approach between Seminole Rock and Skidmore deference. Given 
regulatory textualism’s primacy on politically authorized texts from 
the enacting agency, courts should create strong incentives for clear 
regulatory drafting and supply a stronger judicial check on a 
subsequent agency’s interpretation of the text’s public meaning. 
Specifically, courts should require that later agencies supply a 
reasoned explanation for their interpretation akin to that required 
under arbitrary-and-capricious review.326 Such an approach would 
draw upon an already-familiar concept in administrative law that 
accords deference to the agency’s superior expertise and political ties, 
 
 322. See Stack, supra note 9, at 410–11 (discussing how Seminole Rock could be restricted 
“to particular policymaking form”); Stephenson & Pogoriler, supra note 88, at 1484 (exploring 
complexities in how “Mead’s rationale might also extend to Seminole Rock”).  
 323. Stephenson & Pogoriler, supra note 88, at 1490 (noting that “many statutory schemes 
do not require formal adjudication”). As Stephenson & Pogoriler also point out, agencies could 
voluntarily undertake additional procedures for otherwise informal actions, but it would be 
unclear how much more procedure would merit Seminole Rock deference under Mead’s logic. 
Id. Of course, if agencies undertook full notice-and-comment, they would simply be able to 
amend the rule itself.  
 324. See supra notes 310–312 and accompanying text. 
 325. See supra note 23 and accompanying text. 
 326. See supra notes 150–153 and accompanying text. 
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while at the same time, extending a judicial check on the proffered 
justifications.327 
This proposed approach recognizes that when the enacted text is 
ambiguous or silent with respect to the interpretive question, agencies 
are better equipped than courts to fill in the gaps of the regulation 
through adjudication and enforcement of the rule.328 Agency heads 
are not only more technically competent than judges, but may also 
incrementally develop the rule against changing circumstances and 
specific facts. Any arbitrary agency interpretations, by contrast, 
would be invalid. Such actions would essentially be legislative in 
character and would therefore need to go through the notice-and-
comment process. At the same time, a hard look for regulatory 
interpretations at the second step of Seminole Rock analysis would 
also spur judges to regard such interpretations with more scrutiny 
than they currently do. Consequently, the approach would facilitate 
interpretations that stayed within the textual bounds of the legislative 
rule and were developed through reason-giving. 
Of course, the requisite reasons would differ from those 
demanded of the agency when it originally promulgated the rule, 
because the agency would now be attempting to resolve a narrower 
ambiguity left open by the initial regulatory text. In addition, there 
would not be a full rulemaking record that the agency would have to 
justify. Nevertheless, this regime would help to promote a more 
common-law-like evaluation of the agency’s proffered interpretation 
against the regulatory text.329 Moreover, unlike a wholesale extension 
of Skidmore deference, it would also not require an overruling or 
extreme modification of Seminole Rock, which demands that courts 
give an agency’s interpretation “controlling” weight.330 A hard look 
for agency’s interpretations when the text is otherwise ambiguous 
balances the need for agency flexibility to update regulatory policy, 
 
 327. Motor Vehicle Mfrs. Ass’n of the U.S. v. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co., 463 U.S. 29, 
43 (1983) (emphasizing that, despite hard look, “scope of review under the ‘arbitrary and 
capricious’ standard is narrow and a court is not to substitute its judgment for that of the 
agency”). 
 328. Indeed, some commenters have noted that administrative agencies are better 
situated—and more likely—to act purposively when engaging in statutory interpretation; such 
arguments are even stronger when it comes to an agency’s own regulations. See VERMEULE, 
supra note 18, at 111; Herz, supra note 23, at 118; Sunstein & Vermeule, supra note 18, at 928.  
 329. See Richard W. Murphy, Hunters for Administrative Common Law, 58 ADMIN. L. REV. 
917, 927 (2006). 
 330. Bowles v. Seminole Rock & Sand Co., 325 U.S. 410, 414 (1945). 
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on the one hand, against the countervailing needs for fair notice and 
accountability, on the other. 
CONCLUSION 
This Article has developed a theory of regulatory interpretation 
grounded in the unique character of regulatory texts as products of 
various procedures imposed by politically authoritative actors with 
veto-gate power. Agency regulations are subject to oversight by the 
President, Congress, and the courts through procedures that invite 
the active participation of interest groups and the public. These actors 
and mechanisms supply political and legal legitimacy to the binding 
lawmaking activities of otherwise-unelected bureaucrats. Any theory 
of regulatory interpretation must take these dynamics into account.  
Regulations also implement statutes in narrow policy arenas and 
thus use language that is necessarily complex and specialized. 
Considerations of judicial capacity and agency constraint thus counsel 
the rejection of intentionalism and purposivism as methods of judicial 
regulatory interpretation. Instead, regulatory textualism calls for the 
structured judicial consideration of materials within the ratified 
preamble in order to discern the semantic meaning of the regulatory 
text: the provision-by-provision explanations in the statement of basis 
and purpose, followed by the regulatory analyses. If these materials 
are ambiguous or otherwise conflict, then the court should defer to 
the agency as long as the agency gives a reasoned explanation for its 
interpretation. In this manner, regulatory textualism attempts to 
vindicate the need for flexibility alongside the agency and other 
political actors’ duty to publicly explain their regulatory decisions. At 
the same time, it seeks to leave the development of regulatory policy 
to administrators who, unlike judges, are more capable of reacting to 
changed circumstances and fitting regulatory means to ends. 
 
